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The recent reorganization of American railways and the improvement
in rail transportation service have been characterized by an eminent
authority as "probably the most outstanding industrial accomplishment
since the war."
In this review of economic changes in railways and their administra-
tion and public service since 1920, the significant developments in capital
expenditures for betterments, fi.nancial organization, volume of traffic,
motor vehicle competition, freight and passenger rates, labor conditions,
operating efficiency, net income, valuation, consolidation, and quality of
public service are discussed in turn.
I. CAPITAL EXPENDITURES
The large and continuing expenditure for additions and betterments
to roadway, structures, terminal facilities, signaling, locomotives, and
cars, i.s one outstanding feature in a review of railways since the war
From 1920 to 1927, inclusive, the railways have made gross
capital expenditures of almost six billion dollars.That sum has been
divided about equally between (1) roadway and structures and (2)
equipment—locomotives and cars.The additional investment has not
created more route mileage, but has added to track mileage.The number
of units of equipment has not been changed materially, but the capacity
of the average unit and the aggregate capacity of all have been increased.
For nearly a decade prior to April, 1917, when the United States
entered the World War, the diminishing net income of the railways had
forced a curtailment in the former normal program of expenditures for
enlargement and improvement of the railway plant and equipment.
The common policy had been to keep facilities and their capacity reason-
ably ahead of the demands of steadily increasing traffic.That policy
could not be maintained after 1910, except by relatively few companies.
The financial condition of the carriers as a whole was serious, notably
during the latter part of the five-year period between 1910 and 1915,
1AimualReport of Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, for the fiscal year
1926.
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and many roads were forced into receivership.This alarming situation
was attributable mainly to the growing burden of advancing costs of
material and supplies, higher wage rates, and the disinclination of the
Interstate Commerce Commission to authorize rate increases.Besides,
there was a slowing up in the normal growth in traffic so that the lower
unit costs, usually possible with greater volume of business, could not be
realized.The first effects of the World War, in the latter part of 1914
and throughout 1915, were to hold back business activity in general and
to react unfavorably upon railway earning power.The net railway
operating income of $805,000,000 for the fiscal year ended June 30, 1910,
hadshrunk to $679,000,000 in 1915.
In 1916, the effects of orders for war materials from the Allies, and the
feverish activity in the building and operation of plants engaged in the
manufacture of such materials, were to stimulate business in general and
to increase railway traffic.The net railway operating income jumped
from $679,000,000 in the year ended June 30, 1915, to $1,058,000,000 in
the calendar year 1916.From the point of view of net return upon
railway investment, 1916, with a rate well over 6 per cent, was the best
year the railways have had.The favorable results were possible because
there was just enough unused capacity in facilities to take care of the
heavier traffic without serious overload, so that the economic law of
increasing returns had full play.
Had there been no further disturbance, it is possible that the better
net income might have permitted the railways to resume the former
normal program of betterments and enlargements, and their facilities and
equipment might have been made equal to the needs of an even larger
volume of traffic.But it was difficult to obtain capital funds.The
opportunities in the industrial field were competitively much more
attractive to investors.It was difficult also to obtain materials and
labor when munition and other war supply plants could overbid the
railways.Then when the United States entered the war, came mobiliza-
tion and an extensive national program of construction of cantonments,
ships, aircraft, and the enlargement of other war supply plants.
The railways made a commendable effort to meet the much heavier
transportation demand by voluntarily unifying their operations and
abandoning competition under the Railroads' War Board, but the obstacles
were so great as to prevent continuation of early success.The further
increase in traffic brought an overload on the carriers serving the Atlantic
seaboard, and congestion ensued.The facilities and equipment were
inadequate under the conditions of confusion in right of priority to
preferred service; the carriers were unable to obtain funds on reasonable
terms for vitally needed additional facilities or to refund obligations
about to mature; the draft and demands of war-material production had
left no labor supply; the railway employees, chafing under the growingTRANSPORTATION 257
spread between their wages and those paid to workers in other industries,
demanded advances on threat of strike; and, finally, there was serious
doubt as to whether the railways in their voluntary unification were not
violatingthe ShermanAct.This combination of conditions, notably
the serious traffic congestion, led President Wilson, as a war emergency
measure, to take over the railways, effective January 1, 1918, to be
operated for the Government by a Director General of Railroads.
The results of Federal control and operation of railways from January
1, 1918, to March 1, 1920, need not here be reviewed except to say that
under complete unification, with unprecedented power in the hands of
the Director General, the railways were effectively operated as a branch
of the Government.Traffic congestion was relieved within a few months.
The funds imperatively needed for facilities and equipment were supplied
by the Government.Wages were advanced.Freight and passenger
rates were increased.Nonessential traffic was regulated by the issuance
of permits.In brief, the railways in 1918 produced a greater volume of
transportation than in any previous year, and rail service was effectively
co-ordinated with the war-time activities of the Army, Navy, and allied
branches of Government service.
This summary of events prior to and during the war is here given to
furnish a background for the review of railway policy in capital expendi-
tures the war.It is necessary to bear in mind that normal devel-
opment had been retarded by low earning power immediately preceding
the war, and that railways were underequipped for the overload of war
traffic.It should be borne in mind also that the capital expenditures
made during the period of Federal control were determined primarily by
the peculiar demands of war traffic under unified control, and were
influenced but slightly by considerations which would have governed the
carriers themselves in furthering their purely corporate and competitive
individual interests.In other words, the capital expenditures during
the war-control period (aggregating $1,200,000,000) were determined
mainly by the emergency needs of the hour rather than from the long-
time point of view of the individual carrier and its requirements for
traffic under normal competitive conditions.Most of this program was
authorized and begun in 1918, but a large part was carried over into 1919.
While, in greater part, the money was advanced by the Government from
a revolving fund provided for that purpose by the Federal Control Act,
the cost, with certain minor exceptions, was later assumed by the carriers.
The details of capital expenditures, as reported by the Director General
in 1920, are listed in Table 1.
The year 1920 was one of readjustment and rehabilitation of the
carriers individually after the period of unified Federal control.It was
a year also of heavy traffic, which, because of car shortages, was not
moved without serious delays and inferior service.In an effort to258 RECENTECONOMIC CHANGES
TABLE 1.—CAPITAL EXPENDITURES DURING FEDERAL CONTROL
Item, 1918 1919 Two yeara
Roadway and track $294,000,000 $247,000,000 8541,000,000
Improvements to existing equipment 19,000,000 21,000,000 40,000,000
New equipment purchased by railroads 161,000,000 64,000,000 225,000,000
New equipment purchased by United States
Railroad Administration








improve facilities and equipment, substantial appropriations were made
for additions and betterments.In that year, the gross capital expendi-
tures amounted to $653,267,000.
In 1921 there was a marked decline in railway traffic and earnings,
but the program of betterments was continued.The gross capital
expenditures in that year aggregated $557,035,000, and in 1922 they
were $429,273,000.
These expenditures of the three years 1920 to 1922, inclusive, while
substantial, were far exceeded by the expenditures beginning with 1923,
when the carriers, acting together through the Association of Railway
Executives, in an effort to gain public confidence and goodwill, pledge.d
themselves to "a program to provide adequate transportation."With
a larger volume of traffic in sight, and disturbed by the fear of recurrent
interruptions by car shortage or other transportation difficulty, the
carriers set out to improve their individual performances in technical
efficiency.To make that possible, the appropriations for betterments
were more liberal and comprehensive.
Through the American Railway Association, the railways from
time to time since 1923 have published certain data, compiled by the
Bureau of Railway Economics, showing the annual capital expenditures
of Class I The figures for the years 1920 to 1927, inclusive,
are given in Table 2.The amounts in all cases are greater than those
reported in the annual reports of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
2TheInterstate Commerce Commission classification places in Class I carriers
whose operating revenues are above $1,000,000peryear.Class II carriers are those
whose annual operating revenues are $100,000 to Class III embraces
the remainder, with operating revenues less than $100,000.The route mileage of the
three classes in per cent of total in 1926 was: Class I, 90.63 per cent; Class II, 6 per
cent; Class III, 2.32 per cent.The remaining 1.05 per cent was made up of a few
small railways not reporting to the Interstate Commerce Commission.In operating
revenues Class I roads earned 97.30 per cent of the total, with Classes II and III,
1.49 per cent and .07 per 'cent, respectively.TIM NSPORTA TION 259
as the figures of the Bureau of Railway Economics are the gross amounts
without deductIon for property retired and other similar adjustments.
In Table 2 are included also the net increases in the investment account
of Class I roads and their operating subsidiaries, as adjusted by the
Interstate Commerce Commission for retirements and other factors.
TABLE 2.—CAPITAL EXPENDITURES AND NET ADDITIONS TO INVESTMENT IN ROAD
AND EQUIPMENT, CLASS I RAILWAYS AND THEIR OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES, 1920
TO 1927, INCLUSIVE










































The first column in Table 2 represents the amount of cash expended
for extensions, additions, and betterments; the second column gives the
net amounts added to the property investment account.The difference
is mainly in charges to operating expenses or profit and loss, with corre-
sponding credits to the investment account for property retired or
abandoned in connection with such work.From the point of view of
gross cash expenditures, the improvements made to plant and equipment
in the eight years 1919 to 1927, inclusive, have averaged almost three-
quarters of a billion per year.The net average yearly addition to .the
investment account was $601,064,000, or an increase of nearly 3 per cent
per year.
It is interesting to note that, while for the entire period the expendi-
tures for roadway and track and those for equipment were almost equal
in airiount, the percentage devoted to equipment has been declining.In
1920 it was 60 per cent, but in 1925 and 1926 it was 37 per cent and 36
per cent, respectively.
In Table 3 are shown the details of net charges to investment in
road and equipment and the percentages by the three general accounts.
As supplemental information, Table 4, based on information compiled
by the Bureau of Railway Economics, is added.The table shows the
gross capital expenditures, 1922 to 1927, inclusive, subdivided between
classes of equipment and items in roadway and structures.Under260 RECENTECONOMIC CHANGES
TABLE 3.—NET CHARGES TO INVESTMENT IN ROAD AND EQUIPMENT, n'i GENERAL
ACCOUNTS, CLASS I RAILWAYS AND THEIR OPERATING SuBsIDIAJUEs, 1920 TO.
1927, INcLUsIVE
Year Road Equipment General Total
1920: .
Total $213,793,000 $333,422,000 $ 4,244,000 $551,459,000
Per cent 39 60 100
1921:
Total 186,821,000 251,459,000 3,763,000 442,043,000
Per cent 42 57 100
1922:
Total 219,597,000 139,444,000 3,049.000 362,090,000
Per cent 60 39 100
1923:
Total 336,606,000 466,278,000 5,324,000 808,208,000
Per cent 42 58 a 100
1924:
Total 346,330,000 361,022,000 6,899,000 714,251,000
Per cent 48 51 a 100
1925:
Total 360,526,000 216,009,000 3.440.000 579,975,000
Per cent 62 37 100
1926:
Total 416,371,000 232,694,000 3,354,000 652,419,000
Per cent 64 36 a 100
1927:
Total 522,482,000 163,614,000 11,973,000 698,069,000
Per cent
Grand total
75 23 2 100
$2,602,526,000$2,163,942,000 $42,046,000 $4,808,514,000
Per cent 54 45 1 100
a Lessthan 1 per cent.
TABLE 4.—GROSS CAPITAL EXPENDITURES, CLASS I RAILWAYS AND THEIR OPERATING
SufislolAluEs, 1922 TO 1927, INCLUSIVE
Item Amount Per cent
Locomotives $597,810,000 12.3








Heavier rail 195,656,000 4.1
Shops and enginehouses 218,146,000 4.6
All other improvements





equipment it may be noted that freight cars took 60 per cent of gross
expenditures for equipment or 30 per cent of all gross capital expenditures.
Improvements in Roadway andStructures.—Theeffects of the capital
expenditures since the war may now be viewed from the angle of changes
in physical units, in so far as they may be quantitatively measured.In
road and structures, suitable units are available in but few items, but in
equipment fairly complete information may be had.
Little change in the total route mileage—that is, the miles of roadway
without regard to the number of tracks—has occurred since 1913.The
operated route miles of all railways in that year were 253,470.In 1916
they were 259,211.Since then,the additions have been almost
offset by mileage abandoned.The total operated route miles in 1927
were 259,639.
When the total track miles are considered (instead of route miles or
miles of first track), the changes are more significant.The total track
miles in 1913 were 379,508.Since then, there has been a steady net
increase, notwithstanding losses by abandonment.The total in 1927
was 424,737, an increase since 1913 of 11.9 per cent.The changes since
the war are shown in Table 5.
T.' 5.—MILES OF ROAD AND TRACK OPERATED, ALL RAILWAYS, 1920 TO 1927
INCLUSIVE
The miles of first track in 1927 were practically the same as in 1920.
greatest gain in trackage had been in second and other multiple
running tracks, but a similar increase, larger in absolute amount but
somewhat smaller relatively, is noted in miles of yard tracks and sidings.
These figures indicate that the railway route miles are now fairly ade-
quate for transportation needs, especially in view of highway competi-
tion, and that the network of rail lines is not likely to expand in the
future as it has in the past.But it is likely that there will be continuous
need for the enlargement of capacity of existing lines by the construction
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improvement of terminals.The limiting point in the traffic-carrying
capacity of the typical railway has been, and still is, in its terminals.
A large part of the recent expenditures for capital improvements has
been devoted to terminal improvements.
The capacity of a railway may ordinarily be increased substantially.
by the installation of modern automatic signals.They permit trains
to run under closer headway, reduce the number of train stops, and
otherwise, cut down road delays which have been from 25 per cent to
33 per cent of total time between terminals.The extent of such installa-
tions is indicated by the changes in the mileage 'equipped with automatic
signals.At the close of 1906, the railway route miles so equipped were
6,535.In 1911, they were 19,737; in 1916, 31,167; in 1921, 37,196; and
in 1927 they were 50,953, an increase of 37 per cent over This
substantial increase in signaling, intended to "save seconds safely," has
important bearing upon the gains in operating efficiency.
The data from which it is possible to compute definite units reflecting
changes in such physical elements as weight of rail, number of ties,
depth of ballast, and capacity of bridges are meager.With the greater
strains upon track, roadway, and structures by heavier locomotives and
cars, the tendency is to use heavier rail sections, to increase the number
of ties per rail length, to use ties chemically treated to resist decay, to
apply heavier tie plates, angle bars, and rail fastenings, to use better
ballast and increase its depth, and to replace light bridges and culverts
by new construction with greater strength and longer life.
The average weight of rail in all main tracks of Class I roads on
December 31, 1921, was 82.89 pounds per yard.On December 31, 1927,
it was 88.09 pounds.According to the American Iron and Steel Institute,
the total production of steel rail of 100-pound section or heavier, in 1914,
was but 27 per cent of the total; in 1921 it was 39 per cent, and in 1927
it was 69 per cent.'Nearly one-quarter of the total tons rolled in 1927
were of 120-pound section or heavier.Current installations on several
of the carriers are in sections of 135-pound.
The common use of treated ties, notably during the past six years, has
had the effect, by prolonging the life of ties, of reducing the number
required annually for renewals.Since 1922, the total number of new
ties placed in previously constructed tracks of Class I roads has declined,
notwithstanding the increase in trackage.The renewals in 1922 were
86,642,000; in 1923, 84,435,000; in 1924, 83,073,000; in 1925, 82,717,000;
in 1926, 80,746,000; and in 1927, 78,340,000.While the total renewals
have been less, the number of treated ties has been increasing—40,630,000
in 1922 and 57,083,000 in 1927.The treated ties in 1922 were 47 per
cent of the total, and in 1927, 73 per cent.
Summarized Irom data submitted by 169 railways in answer to Interstate Com-
merce Commission questionnaire of July 22, 1927.TRANSPORTATION 263
Locomotives and Cars.—When we turn to an examination of the
equipment inventory in 1927 and the comparison with 1920, the striking
fact is that there has been but a slight increase in the number of freight
cars and an actual decrease in the number of locomotives, although the
ton-mile product in 1927 was greater.With practically the same number
of all passenger train cars, a decrease is shown in passenger carrying cars.
The explanation is that the capacity of the average locomotive4 and
freight car has increased, and, because of better facilities and improved
operating technique, the equipment isbeing used more effectively.
Hence, the railways, with practically the same number of freight cars in
1927 as in 1920, were able to handle substantially more tonnage and to
provide service free from congestion or undue delay.The decline in
passenger traffic accounts for the smaller number of passenger cars.
The number of steam locomotives in all classes of service on Class I
roads in 1920 was 64,368.In 1927 it was but 60,868.The average
tractive capacity, however, in 1920 was 36,365 pounds, while in 1927
it was 42,803 pounds.Thus the aggregate capacity of the smaller
number of locomotives in 1927 was actually about 11 per cent greater than
the aggregate capacity of the larger number in 1920.The improvement
in locomotive design, moreover, has not been confined to the increase in
tractive capacity.There is now a greater use of economizing devices,
such as high-pressure boilers, superheaters, feed-water heaters, limited
cut-off, boosters, and other improvements in design.
The number of freight cars owned by Class I railways in 1920 was
2,340,761, and the average capacity per car was 42.4 tons.In 1927,
the total of railway-owned cars was 2,324,101 and the average capacity
per car was 45.6 tons.Thus, while in number there has been little change,
the aggregate capacity, because of retirement of old cars of low capacity,
has been increased 8 per cent.Private line freight cars used in railroad
service on a rental basis are not included in the totals.Of these, there
were 203,372 in 1923 and 288,446 in 1927.
The number of passenger service cars of Class I roads in 1920 was
53,501.In 1927 it was 53,822.There was a slight increase in baggage,
mail, and express cars, but the number of coaches and combination cars
decreased from 36,814 in 1920 to 32,023 in 1927.Pullman cars, of which
there were 7,764 in 1922 and 9,017 in 1927, are not included in the
total.Elsewhere it is noted that the shrinkage in railway-borne passen-
gers is mainly in local service.The cars released by taking off local
trains are mainly of old type, and the retirements have not been offset
entirely by acquisition of new equipment for through trains.6The
details of equipment changes are listed in Table 6.
4See Improvement in Power Plant, Chap. II, Industry, Part 2, pp. 119 et seq.;
Chap. IV, Transportation, Part 2, p. 312.
6SeeObsolescence, Chap. II, Industry, Part 2, pp. 129, 139; Chap. III, Construc-
tion, p. 226; Chap. V, Marketing, p. 330.264 RECENTECONOMIC CHANGES
TABLE 6.—EQUIPMENT OF CLASS I RAILWAYS, 1920TO1927, INcLusivE
Year
Steam locomotives" Freight train cars5 Passenger train
carsc
Total I




















































































a In1920 there were 153 electric locomotives; in 1927 there were 449.
bPrivateline freight ears not included.
Pullman cgra not included.
The greater use of steel in car construction is noteworthy.In 1920,
the number of all-steel freight cars was 630,150.Of steel underframe
with wood bodies there were 886,296.Of the total cars, 27 per cent were
all-steel and 38 per cent had steel underframes, or 65 per cent in both
classes.In 1927, there were 799,820 cars of all-steel and 1,086,982 with
steel underframes—34 per cent of the total in all-steel, 47 per cent
with steel underframes, or 81 per cent in all.In 1920, there were 15,111
passenger train cars of all-steel, or 28 per cent of the total, and with steel
underframes there were 6,573, or 12 per cent of the total, making 40 per
cent of steel construction.In 1927, this percentage had grown to 65 per
cent—25,342, or 47 per cent, of all steel and 9,677, or 17 per cent, with
steel underframes.
- II.CHANGES IN FINANCIAL ORGANIZATION
Compared with the recent substantial additions to capital invest-
ment, the increase in railway capital obligations is relatively small.In
Tables 7 and 8 are shown, by years beginning with 1920, the total invest-
ment of all railways in road and equipment and the total capitalization in
stocks and bonds.
Subject to qualifications hereinafter noted, three significant points
stand out in a comparison of the figures in the two tables and their rela-
tion to gross capital expenditures.6
6 The difference between the gross capital expenditures and the net additions to
the investment account is explained by the credits to investment and corresponding
charges to operating expenses or to surplus for property retired and replaced or
abandoned.Operating expenses or surplus must be charged and the investment
account credited with the original cost of property consumed in operation, and theTRANSPORTATION 265
1. The aggregate gross expenditures for extensions, additions, and
betterments during the years 1920 to 1927, inclusive, (Table 2) were
$5,978,296,000.
2. The net increase in the account "Investment in Road and Equip-
ment" during the same period (Table 7) was $4,604,551,000.
3. The net increase in railway capitalization (stocks and funded debt)
during the same period (Table 8) was $1,142,761,000.
From the fact that additional securities amounting to $1,142,761,000
were issued against an additional investment of $4,604,551,000, it is
evident that the railways have been financing the greater part of improve-
ment work out of current income or surplus.
Prior to July 1, 1907, there was no classification of expenditures for
road and equipment, and the accounting methods of the carriers were
not uniform.The policy of many prosperous carriers had been to charge
substantial parts of improvement costs to operating expenses, thereby
understating the investment account and creating hidden reserves.
Many of the weak carriers, on the other hand, went to the opposite
extreme in charging to capital amounts which should have been charged
to current operation, thereby bringing about an overstatement of invest-
ment with a corresponding overstatement of current net income.In
defense of the prosperous roads, it may be said that this "ploughing in"
process was on the side of conservatism, even though disguised by an
understatement of net profits, but, with respect to the opposite policy of
the weak carriers, there is no defense except that of financial expediency
when true accounting, might have precipitated financial trouble by
calling attention to inadequate earning power.In either case, the carrier
was not bound by specific instructions from the Commission, as its
earlier efforts to bring about uniformity had not been extended to the
investment account.While the carriers were required to reports
the details of their balance sheet and surplus accounts, each was left
free to follow its own accounting policy in the matter of capital expendi-
tures.Hence the balance sheet account "Cost of Road and Equipment,"
prior to 1907, was not uniformly kept.It is probable that the under-
charges to that account, by reason of capital expenditures absorbed in
operating expenses, were greater than the overcharges improperly made
to hold down operating expenses.
Since 1907, the carriers have been governed by definite instructions
from the Commission, and the additions to the investment account in
the 20 years of uniformity in accounting have been so large in the aggre-
gate as to reduce the questionable base of 1907 to but one-half of the
investment account charged with the original cost of the replacements or additions.
The net addition to the investment account may be capitalized in full either at the
time the expenditures are made or later, but conservatism demands that securities
should not be issued against the whole amount.266 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
present total.On June 30, 1907, the book value of road and equipment,
all carriers, was reported as $13,030,344,328, and on December 31, 1927,
it was $24,453,870,938.
Inasmuch as we are concerned here only with recent changes, the
since the war.The lack of
not affect the present corn-
been accounted for under
TABLE 7.—INVESTMENT IN ROAD AND EQUIPMENT, ALL RAILWAYS, DECEMBER 31,
1920TO1927

















TABLE 8.—CAPITALIZATION OF ALL RAILWAYS, DECEMBER 31, 1920 TO1927











































































Attention has been called to the relatively large part of additional
net investment financed from income and surplus.That conservative
policy of financing, however, was not altogether one of choice.As a
matter of fact, the railways, because of unsatisfactory net earnings just
before and immediately after the war, were unable, with a few notable
exceptions, to sell stock, and their bonds in the early postwar period
could be sold only at high rates of interest or at substantial discount.7
Throughout the period 1920 to 1927, inclusive, oniy eight companies—Illinois
Central, New York Central, Chesapeake & Ohio, Southern, New York, Chicago &
St. Louis, Baltimore & Ohio, Atlantic Coast Line, and St. Louis-San Francisco—
sold any substantial amounts of stock to the public for cash.The only other sales
for cash were in connection with reorganization or were for intercorporate purposes.
In 1920, the Pennsylvania Railroad found it necessary to offer 7 per cent in order to
sell a 10-year bond for refunding purposes.In refunding their joint issue of collateral
trust bonds, based on Chicago, Burlington & Quincy stock, the Great Northern and
figures in Table 7 are confined to the years
uniformity in accounting prior to 1907 does
parison, as the additions since 1907 have
uniform practice.TRANSPORTATION 267
SHEET,CLASS I RAILWAYS EXCLUSIVE OF THEIR




Investmentin road and equipment
Improvements on leased railway property.
Miscellaneous physical property
















Premium on capital stock
Total stock



















Additionsto property through income
Funded debt retired through income
Sinking fund reserves
Miscellaneous fund reserves
Appropriated surplus not specifically
Total appropriated surplus
Profit and loss surplus—balance
Total corporate surplus
Grand total
discount.The prevailing rate during that time and for a year or two later was from
6 to per cent for well-secured mortgage bonds.The average rate of interest
(based upon par without taking into account discount) upon all new bondsissued in
1922 was 5.53 per cent.The average has since been lower—5.29 per cent in 1923,
5.05 per cent in 1924, 5.16 per cent in 1925, 4.88 per cent in 1926, and 4.84 per cent
in 1927.These averages, reported by the Interstate Commerce Commission, would
be more significant if the yield were based upon the amount actually paid rather than




















































































Northern Pacific in 1921 had to offer the new issue atper cent and to sell at
26,261,843 26,968,585
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A general view of the financial structure of Class I railways in 1920
and 1927 is afforded by Table 9, in which are condensed the significant
items of the balance sheets of Class I railways as of December 31, 1920
and 1927.These figures are for the owned properties of Class I railways
and therefore do not include their nonoperating subsidiaries.The
tabulation is not complete but is intended merely for the purpose of
comparison between the two periods.
The impracticability, except in the few exceptional cases, of carriers
financing the capital improvements of recent years by the sale of stock
has led to an unhealthy tendency to increase the proportion which the
funded debt bears to total capitalization.While no hard and fast rule
can be applied without qualification, financial prudence dictates that
the stake of the stockholders in the enterprise which they control should
be little, if any, less than the amount which they borrow. *
Duringthe decade of 1890—1900, the ratio of funded debt to total
capitalization of all railways ranged between 50 and 53 per cent.In the
following decade, it began at 49 per cent and ended at 56 per cent.Since
1910, it has steadily increased, and, since 1923, has stood between 59 and
60 per cent.The figures in Table 9, for Class I railways only, show that
the ratio was 57.9 per cent in 1920 and 58.1 per cent in 1927.Including
roads of Classes II and III, the ratio in 1927 was 59 per cent.
III. CHANGES IN VOLUME OF TRAFFIC
The two principal measures of railway traffic volume are revenue
ton-miles and revenue passenger-miles.These units take account not
only of the number of tons and passengers, but also of the distance
carried in each case.
Transportation by rail in 1920 was one of record-breaking proportions.
In tons, ton-miles, passengers, and passenger-miles, the volume was
substantially greater than in 1916, the previous year of high record.
Business in general was unusually active, in contrast to the inactivity
of 1919, and the civilian passenger traffic was augmented by the processes
of demobilization of military forces.
From the point of view of freight service, there have been three
relatively poor years since 1920.The revenue ton-miles of 1921, 1922,
and 1924 were less than those of 1920, but with a larger volume of business
in the other postwar years the trend of freight traffic has been upward.
The year 1926 now holds the record—443.7 billion revenue ton-miles for
*Thisis clearly an expression of opinion.It may be argued that investments
in public utilities should be mainly nonspeculative and should have a limited return,
that bonds with their fixed and relatively low return are less speculative than stocks,
and that, if the Transportation Act is successfully administered, the railway net
income will, on the whole, be adequate to permit regularity of interest payment
on a large percentage of fixed obligations in the cases of those roads which might
in any case market stock.—Note by George Soule, Director of the National Bureau.exception is noted in products of mines which, because of labor troubles
at the coal mines in 1921 and 1922, moved in smaller volume.The coal
tonnage is such a large part of the total that fluctuations in that single
item may distort the percentage relationships of other commodity groups
to total.For example, in 1921, the tonnage of products of agriculture
was but 1 per cent more than in 1920, yet its proportion of total tons
jumped from 9.76 per cent to 13.17 per cent, because the tonnage of mine
products fell off so sharply with losses in all other groups.The volume
of tonnage of agricultural products has been remarkably uniform through-
out the entire period, the upper and lower extremes being 230.9 million
tons in 1924 and 215.1 million tons in 1925.The same comment may
be applied to animal products and forest products, although the fluctua-
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Class I railways.The comparable figure in 1927 was 428.6 billions; in
1.925 it was 413.8 billions; and in 1920 it was 410.3 billions.
In contrast to the growth in freight tonnage, the passenger-miles
have fallen off seriously.The total of 1920—46.8 billion passenger-miles
on Class I railways—is likely to stand for a long time as the high record.
Since then, with one exception, every successive year has shown a
substantial decline both in passengers carried and in passenger-miles.
The passenger-miles on Class I railways in 1927 were 33.6 billions, a
decrease from 1920 of 13.2 billions, or 28 per cent.This decline will be
discussed in the next section of this chapter.
The details of both freight and passenger transportation for Class I
railways, 1920 to 1927, are shown in Table 10.
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tions are greater than those in agricultural products.A much greater
range is apparent in manufactured products.These moved upward or
downward in harmony with fluctuations in the tonnage of mine products.
The volume of less-than-carload tonnage shows a downward tendency,
reflecting the effect of motor truck competition.
TABLE 11.—REVENUE FREIGHT CARRIED, BY CLASSES
RAILWAYS, 1920 TO 1927
op CoMMoDITIEs,CLASS I
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A comparison of the carloadings and the ton-miles indicates that
the fluctuations do not correspond in degree.In 1927, the excess of
ton-miles over 1920 was 4.5 per cent, while the excess of cars loaded was
14.6 per cent.The difference is attributable in large measure to a lighter
carload in 1927, but it is possible also that the carload statistics are not as
carefully compiled as are the ton-miles.The discrepancy is not as great
in later years.The per cent of decrease in ton-miles, 1927 under 1926,
was 3.4 per cent, and the decrease in loaded cars was 2.5 per cent.
The average length of the haul (per railway) shows little change
in freight service, but the average journey per passenger (per railway)
shows an increase.This is owing to the loss of local passengers to the
highway and to a slight increase in the number of long-distance passengers.
These averages are partially deceptive in that interline tons and passen-
gers (those which in a given movement are handled by more than one
railroad) are counted once by each railroad and are thus duplicated in the
totals.A better index of the freight haul is found by dividing the total
ton-miles by the tons originated, thus giving the average haul per ton on
the railways of the United States considered as one system.In 1920, the
average haul per ton on that basis for all railways was 303.5 miles; in
1921 it was 304.11 miles; and in 1927 it was 314.75 miles.For the
passenger service no such basis is available, as no distinction is made in
the statistics between originated and total passengers carried.
In view of the steady decline in the total passengers carried by rail,
it is of interest to note that the number carried in Pullman cars (included
in the railway total) has had an upward tendency.The number of
Pullman car passengers in 1921 was 31,225,324, or 3 per cent of the total
passengers carried by rail.By 1926, the number had grown to 36,073,211,
or 4.2 per cent of total.In 1927, it had dropped to 35,197,178, but,
because the loss in total passengers had been relatively greater, the
PuLman percentage of the total remained atper cent.
The changes in relative proportions of Pullman, commutation, and
day-coach passengers (other than commutation) are more striking when
stated in terms of revenue.In 1921, the Pullman passengers contributed
31.1 per cent of the total passenger revenue; in 1927, their contribution
was 45.3 per cent, with a corresponding decline in total day-coach
revenues from 68.9 per cent to 54.7 per cent.If, however, the com-
mutation passenger revenue is segregated, the loss in day-coach passenger
revenue other than commutation is much more impressive.Commuta-
tion passenger statistics are not available prior to 1922.In that year,
the commutation revenue was 6.3 per cent of the total, and in 1927 it
was 7.6 per cent.In the meantime, the day-coach passenger revenue
(exclusive of commutation) declined from 59.9 per cent to 47.1 per cent.8
8Thesepercentages are taken from a study made by Samuel 0. Dunn, editor,
Railway Age, and used by him editorially in .the issue of March 19, 1927.272 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
IV. EFFECT OF MOTOR VEHICLE COMPETITION
The passenger automobile as a modern agency of transportation is
about twenty-five years old.The motor truck and the motor coach are
even younger.Yet in many respects the autorriotive industry, in its
quarter-century of development, has outstripped the railways, now a
century old. The public investment in motor vehiicles and hard-surfaced
highways now exceeds the public investments in railways and their
equipment.The number of employees in the automotive industry and
highway transportation is more than those engaged in railway service.
Motor vehicles now rank first in value of annual products and third in
value of exported goods.
The effects of the private automobile and the motor coach on railway
passenger traffic, and of the motor truck on railway freight traffic,. are
difficult to measure accurately.It is impossible to determine how many
passenger-miles made by private motor vehicles are due solely to the
desire to ride for pleasure, and how many passenger-miles are substitutes
for railway transportation.To a large extent the passenger traffic by
highway is not competitive with railways.It is created by the auto-
mobile itself, and would not be produced by railways if the automobile
were not available.Passenger traffic by motor coach, however, is
highly competitive with the electric and steam railways.The motor
truck, almost entirely displacing the horse-drawn vehicles in urban
communities, has widened the zone of local trucking and is taking from
railways a substantial part of short-haul traffic in small shipments.In
practically every city there are organizations of common carriers by
motor truck.Then there are the contract truckers who serve only one
or a limited number of customers under contract, and finally there are
the trucks owned and operated by the individual industries for their own
service exclusively.
The steady decline in railway passenger traffic since 1920 (Table 11)
is evidence that the competition of motor vehicles is severe.The auto-
mobile is being used more and more on relatively short trips, both for
business and pleasure, that formerly were made by rail.The public
has recently shown a decided preference for the motor coach over the
steam railway coach and the trolley car.
The railway loss has not been in the long-distance passengers.The
Pullman car statistics support the statement that railway long-distance
passenger traffic continues to grow slowly.It is probable, however, that
the growth would have been much greater if the automobile and motor
coach had not been developed.
Nor is the railway loss in suburban traffic.The number of commu-
tation passengers has been increasing steadily—about 3 per cent per year
since 1921.The railway loss is confined almost entirely to the trafficTIM NSPORTA TION 273
on local trains between adjacent cities or on secondary or branch lines.
Such losses are serious, as the local passenger trains ordinarily have been
poor earners, if not unremunerative, and the lighter loads have increased
the number of trains with gross earnings less than the actual "out of
pocket" expenses.This has brought about curtailment of train service
or abandonment of branch lines, when such action is permitted by the
regulatory authorities, and the effect of poorer railway service has been
to stimulate the transfer of passengers to the highway.
The railway managers are concerned about the heavy losses in
passenger traffic and the further competitive possibilities.To meet the
new form of competition, many railways, besides improving their -through
train service, have organized motor coach companies as subsidiaries, and
are recapturing a part of the lost traffic by catering to the public prefer-
ence for rubber tires over steel.Motor coach lines are being operated
by railways as substitutes for branch line steam trains, as auxiliaries to
rail service, and even in the duplication of rail service.The railways,
either directly or through subsidiaries, early in 1928 operated about
1,046 motor coaches over 10,519 route miles, and the service is expanding.
The importance of this new railway activity is shown by the fact that
the American Railway Association has recently created a new organi-
zation known as the Motor Transport Division of that association.
The competition of motor trucks in freight .service is not so alarming
from the railway point of view.The potentialities are not as great as
in passenger service.A reasonable estimate of the transportation
production of all motor trucks on the highways outside of cities is that
they produce a total ton-mileage equivalent to less than 3 per cent of
the actual ton-miles produced by railways.In mass movements over
long distances the railway is supreme.To haul as much revenue freight
as is carried by the average freight train with a crew of five or six men
would require at least 140 fully loaded 5-ton trucks, with at least that
number of operators, and with a total fuel cost of over $5 per mile in
contrast to the railroad fuel cost of about 50 cents per mile.The trucks
cannot compete successfully, except in the narrowly limited field of
small short-haul shipments of relatively high value, or when the combi-
nation of pick-up, road haul, and final delivery service by truck saves
time and minimizes damage or loss by theft.The zone, within which
motor trucks can economically compete with railways for the transpor-
tation of selected commodities, varies with local conditions, but in a typical
case the limit is from 30 to 50 miles, with a wider range under conditions
favorable to the truck and for a small number of commodities.
The railway commodity statistics (Table 11) show that the volume
of less-than-carload freight is declining.A part of the loss may be
attributed to motor truck competition.Studies made by the highway
authorities of several states indicate that the volume of truck-borne274 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
tonnage which might move by rail is substantial and is increasing.
Relatively, however, the freight which the motor truck is taking from
the rails is small and, what is more important, it is the kind of traffic
which the railways can give up with little, if any, net loss.The small,
short-haul shipments, while yielding a high gross revenue per ton-mile,
are carried at exceedingly high ton-mile cost, and the net revenue is
relatively low.This kind of traffic is burdensome in its demands upon
terminals and freight cars, and usually is moved in way-freights, the
poorest paying of freight trains.Confronted with the continuing neces-
sity for enlarging terminals and increasing the productivity of equipment,
the railways may regard with equanimity the loss of a part of the tonnage
which is least attractive from the viewpoint of net revenue, and they
can devote the released capacity in facilities and equipment to the
long-haul and better-paying tonnage.
As in the case of competition of motor coaches in passenger service,
the railways are entering the field of motor trucking by establishing
highway freight service where it is more economical or gives better public
service than by rail.In this field,, however, railway activity is not as
great as in meeting motor coach competition.Thus far the railway-
controlled highway freight service is confined to substitution of trucks
for way-freights or branch-line trains, or to serve as collecting or dis-
tributing media within metropolitan zones.To a small extent, a few
railways have gone into the so-called "store door delivery" plan, under
which the freight is called for or delivered by railway-controlled motor
trucks.This practice is likely to be extended when the disputed points of
carrier liability and extra charges for the service are satisfactorily settled.
The possibility of further inroads on railway revenues by highway
competition depends in part upon Congressional action.To a large
extent, motor. vehicles, notably motor trucks, are unregulated except in
minor particulars.In some statesauthorities exercise certain police
powers, especially with respect to motor coaches, but, broadly speaking,
the trucks have a free hand in the matter of rates and assume no con-
tinuing obligation to serve.Under such circumstances, the railways
have justification for complaint against unfair competition.Efforts
have been made to enact a law which would place definite obligations
upon common carriers by highway, and there was promise that action
bearing upon motor coaches would be taken by Congress early in 1928.
The bill, however, was not enacted.While it is probable that a similar
bill affecting motor coaches may be passed in 1929, the likelihood of
Federal regulation of trucks is more remote.
V. CHANGES IN FREIGHT AND PASSENGER RATES
The Federal Control Act, approved March 21, 1918, gave legislative
sanction to the terms under which President Wilson, as an emergencyTRANSPORTATION 275
war measure, took control of railways, effective January 1, 1918, and
clothed the President with wide powers over the rates to be charged to
the public for transportation service.During the period of Federal
control of railways, the Interstate Commerce Commission, temporarily
shorn of power to suspend rates initiated by the Director General of
Railroads acting for the President, left the determination of rates and
classifications in greater part with the Director General.To meet the
extra burden of war-time prices of materials and the substantial increases
in wages of railway employees,, the Director General, on May 25, 1918,
ordered a horizontal increase of approximately 25 per cent in freight
rates and advanced the passenger rates to three cents per mile.Where
the existing rate was higher than three cents per mile, no increase was
ordered.Suburban fares were advanced 10 per cent.For the passenger
service as a whole, the increase was approximately 18 per cent, to which was
added a surcharge of one-half cent per mile on tickets used in Pullman
cars.9Although strongly urged by the representatives of the railway
corporations, during the second year of Federal control, to authorize
further rate increases in recognition of further heavy increases in expenses,
no further general advances in rates were authorized by the Director
General.While numerous adjustments in individual rates were made,
the majority were reductions rather than increases.
The fact that the rate basis in effect in 1919 was inadequate to insure a
reasonable return to the railways was recognized by Congress in the
Transportation Act of 1920.Into that law was written affirmatively a
mandate to the Interstate Commerce Commission to establish rate scales
which, under honest and economical management, would "as nearly
as may be" yield to the railways as a whole, in territorial groups, a fair
return on the value of property used in transportation service.The
value was to be determined by the Commission.For the first two
years the fair return was defined as 6 per cent,. but the Commission was
empowered to change that rate from time. to time thereafter.'°
Basing their estimates in part upon the book investment figures sub-
mitted by the railways, and in part upon the tentative physical valuation
of approximately one-quarter of railway mileage, and taking into account
the wage increases ordered on July 20,1920,. by the United States
Railroad Labor Board,. the Commission, effective August 28,1920,
authorized increases in freight rates of 40 per cent in the East, 25 per cent
0Theadditional charge on tickets used in Pullman cars was discontinued late
in 1918.
i°"Duringthe two years beginning March 1, 1920, the. Commission shall take as
such fair return a sum equal to per cent of such aggregate value, but may, in its
discretion, add thereto a sum not exceeding one-half of 1 per cent of such aggregate
value to make provision in whole or in part for improvements, betterments, or equip-
ment which.. .arechargeable to capital account."(Sec. 15a).In 1922 the Corn-.
mission setper cent as the fair return, omitting any reference to an additional sum
for capital improvements.276 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
in the South, 35 per cent in the West, and 25 per cent in Mountain-
Pacific territory.The weighted average was between 30 and 35 per cent.
In passenger service, the ticket rates were advanced uniformly (about
20 per cent) throughout the country, bringing the standard rate to 3.6
cents per mile, and charges for Pullman car seats and berths were
increased 50 per cent (the added charge to be retained by the railways
rather than the Pullman Co.).These increases" were intended, under
the estimated volume of traffic, operating expenses, and taxes for the
following year, to yield 6 per cent on estimated property value, but, while
the Commission apparently accepted without question the railway
estimates of revenues and expenses, it was unwilling to accept the book
value as the basis for computing the return.The railways' book cost
at the time was given as slightly in excess of $20,000,000,000.The
Commission, principally upon the basis of certain tentative valuation
returns, arbitrarily wrote down the book value to $18,900,000,000.
This reduction in the base was equivalent to cutting down the estimated
return from 6 to 5.7 per cent on the book value of the railway investment.
The carriers, however, were able to earn but a small part of the
estimated net income in the first year under the new rates, because the
volume of traffic in 1921 was very much smaller than the estimate.
The earned return on book value was but 2.9 per cent.
The extent of the rate increases of 1920 was surprising to the shipping
public, but, in that era of inflation and while business was booming, the
higher transportation charges were accepted with little protest.Corn.-
plaints began when the depression set in early in 1921, and throughout
that entire year the railways and the Interstate Commerce Commission
were besieged by requests for rate reductions.Many such reductions
were made by the railways voluntarily, as previous relationships in
absolute differentials in cents per 100 pounds between rates on certain
commodities and between certain points were unduly disturbed by the
horizontal percentage increases of 1918 and 1920.In the aggregate, the
rate reductions were substantial, but they were not general enough to
meet the widespread demand.The pressure of the agricultural bloc in
Congress was focused upon the railways and the Commission.After
hearings, the Commission ordered reductions in the rates on livestock,
hay, and grain, and subsequently the railways voluntarily offered to
reduce by 10 per cent the rates on all products of the farm, orchard, and
ranch.The offer was approved by the Commission and the reduction
became effective in October, 1921, but in the meantime the Commission
instituted a prolonged inquiry into railway management and its relation
to the rate scale as a whole.
Notwithstanding the meager net earnings of the carriers, the shippers'
view, that the railway financial problem was but temporary and that
11Thegeneral average increase for all classes of service was about 32percent.TRANSPORTATION 277
lower rates would probably stimulate business, prevailed with the Com-
mission.In May, 1922, a general in freight rates was ordered,
but passenger rates were not changed.
Since then, there have been no general increases or decreases, but
many changes, practically all downward, have been made either volun-
tarily or by Commission order.The efforts of the western carriers,
beginning in 1924 and still continuing, to prove that their impaired
financial situation justified a general advance in rates, have been unsuc-
cessful.The Commission in 1926 definitely denied the application for
a general 5 per cent rate increase, and has since ordered still further
reductions in the rates on livestock and fruit.
The standard rate in passenger service has been 3.6 cents per passenger-
mile since the advances of 1920.While that rate has been attacked
from time to time, the demand has not been insistent or general.Such
is not the case with respect to the Pullman ticket surcharge of 50 per
cent.Complaint on that score has been bitter and continuous.The
drive against the surcharge was carried into Congress, with a view to
having it abolished by direct legislation.Such efforts, however, have
fallen short of success, and, in the meantime, after investigation and
hearings, the Commission declined in February, 1924, to order a change.
Considering the passenger and freight services separately, the revenue
and cost figures indicate that the net revenue from the transportation
of passengers is relatively less than that from freight, and inasmuch as
the carriers have not been earning and are not earning the promised
fair return on value, it is obvious that the abolition of the surcharge
would result in an even lower return for the service as a whole, or would
require an advance in freight rates sufficient in degree to overcome the
loss.'2As has already been noted, the number of passengers in Pullman
cars has been increasing steadily, notwithstanding the surcharge, while
the number of passengers in coaches, under uniform rates since 1920,
has been declining.
The average revenue per passenger-mile and per ton-mile are often
used as indexes of average rates.13The two averages are significant, and
12In1927, the passenger service operating expenses of Class I railways took 89.69
per cent of passenger service revenues; in freight service the ratio was 70.29 per cent.
For all classes of service the operating ratio was 74.54 per cent.
13 comparativepurposes the two averages are subject to qualifications and may
not always reflect a true indication of rate levels.The general scale of passenger
rates has not been changed materially since 1920, yet, because of the varying propor-
tions borne to the total by through passengers carried under competitive rates, local
passengers carried under the standard distance tariff of 3.6 cents per mile, and com-
mutation passengers carried under very low passenger-mile rates, the average revenue
per passenger-mile for all classes of service fluctuates from month to month and from
year to year.In freight service the average revenue per ton—mile is influenced by the
proportions of tonnage carried under very iow rates and very high rates, as well as by
the proportions of long-haul and short-haul tonnage.The general average is often
affected as much by changes in volume of different commodities as by changes in rates.278 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
they are given in Table
average hauls in each case,
of agriculture, mines and
relatively low• rates.For
Pullman car passengers and
° Pullmanpassenger-miles not available.
12.With the revenue units are shown the
as well as the tonnage propOrtions of products
forests, as these commodities move under
the passenger service the proportions of
commutation passenger-miles are given.
TON-MILE AND PER PASSENGER-MILE WITH
CLASS I RAILWAYS, 1920 TO 1927
than usual, are not substantial, nor are there any noticeable variations
in the average haul.These two factors, showing no noticeable change in
the average revenues per ton-mile, may be taken as fairly indicative of
the effect of rate reductions in 1921 and subsequent years.The full
effect of the 1920 increases bore upon the traffic of 1921, and subsequent
decreases held down the averages of later years.Since 1921, the average
receipts per ton-mile have declined steadily from 1.275 cents in that
year to 1.080 cents in1927.14
14Ifthe total ton-miles of 1927 had moved under the average ton-mile revenue of
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In passenger service, the decline in the average receipts per passenger-
mile, as already noted, is attributable in but small part to reductions
in rates, although the• practice of offering reduced rates for excursions
and for other special purposes has been extended.The lower average
revenue is attributable rather to the heavy losses in local passengers
paying the standard rate of 3.6 cents per mile, and slight increases in
both the long-distance passengers (carried at rates in many cases some-
what less than standard) and, in commutation passengers who enjoy
subnormal rates.The substantial and consistently continuous increase
in the proportion of Pullman car passengers to total passengers carried
is noticeable.
Inasmuch as the drop in average receipts per passenger-mile is due
principally to causes other than changes in rates, it would not be proper,
as in the case of freight service, to assume that the lower average actually
saved any money to the public.As a matter of fact, the commutation
rates in several eases have been increased.
VI. CHANGES IN RELATIONS BETWEEN RAILWAY MANAGEMENT AND
EMPLOYEES'5
The railways emerged from the period of Federal control with lowered
employee morale.'6The centralization of power in the Director General,
and in the bipartisan boards organized by him, had appreciably weakened
the authority of the managers of the individual carriers. *Thestrength
of railway labor unions and the prestige of their leaders had been sub-
stantially enhanced by the large wage increases and many concessions
made during the war period.The first general increase affecting all
employees was announced in May, 1918, retroactive to January 1, 1918,
and several supplementary increases to separate classes, such as shopmen,
were granted in 1919.Altogether the wage increases, or their equivalent
in shortening of the working day, payment of punitive overtime rates,
and other changes which affected the pay roll favorably from the point
of view of the employee, added about $1,000,000,000 per year to total
wages, or about $500 per employee per year.
In the closing months of the period of Federal control, the railway
labor unions attempted to obtain further increases, but the Director
General refused, urging the employees to be patient and hold their
SeeLabor Relations, Chap. II, Industry, Part 1, pp. 87, 90; Chap. III, Cdn-
struetion, p. 251; Chap. IV, Transportation, Part 2, p. 315; Chap. VI, Labor, p. 479;
Chap. VII, Management, pp. 514—531.
16Thelower employee morale was not peculiar to railways but was common to
industry in 1920.
*Anyinference that a lowered morale of employees was associated with the
strengthening of the unions under bipartisan boards of adjustment is, in my opinion,
unfortunate.The lowered morale was due largely to the fact that in 1919 the cost
of living had risen much more than wages.—Note by George Soule, Director.280 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
petitions for, determination by the Railroad Labor Board to be created
by the Transportation Act, then under consideration by Congress.
The Railroad Labor Board, created by the Transportation Act of 1920,
consisted of nine members: three representing each group, employees,
management, and the public.Its first decision was made under great
pressure for quick action, on July 20, It granted increases which
averaged about 22 per cent tO practically all employees, or at the rate
of over $600,000,000 per year.During the remainder of 1920 and until
1926 (when it was abolished), the Board was kept busy with disputes
which should have been dealt with by adjustment boards.The law
intended that the Railroad Labor Board should deal primarily with wage
rates and broad working conditions, as provision was made also for the
organization of bipartisan adjustment boards, subordinate to the Labor
Board, to deal with disputes concerning rules and working conditions.
But the creation of such adjustment boards was made optional rather
than mandatory, and the law left for joint determination by labor and
management whether such boards should be on a national, regional, or
system basis.The unions affiliated with the American Federation of
Labor,'7 viewing with satisfaction the substantial accomplishment in
standardization during Federal control, insisted upon national boards.
To this the railways would not agree.By majority action they stood
out for system boards.A minority of railway executives were willing
to compromise on regional boards, but were outvoted.Thus the two
parties were deadlocked, and as a matter of fact no affirmative action
was ever taken in organizing the adjustment boards contemplated by
law, although many system boards were formed by mutual consent
subsequent to 1922.
The record of the Railroad Labor Board was one of trouble with both
labor and management, and of internal strife after the first year of its
existence.Shortly subsequent to its award of an increase of 22 per cent
in wages in July, 1920, the depression of 1921 and the serious impairment
of railway net income were apparent, and the carriers petitioned the
board to cut wages to the level of 1920.Hearings were begun in Janu-
ary, 1921, but no decision was announced until June, when the Board
authorized a 12 per cent reduction.This left the wage scale about 8
per cent above the 1920 base.The result was disappointing both to
labor and to management.The latter had hoped for a much deeper cut,
and announced their intention to move for further decreases. ,Smarting
under the 12 per cent reduction, the possibility of further losses was
met by the train service employees by a threat to strike, and in June,
1921, a serious dispute was narrowly averted by the acceptance of the
wage reduction, with an implied assurance on the part of the managers
that requests for further decreases would be withheld.The train
Practicallyall except the four train service brotherhoods.TRANSPORTATION 281
servicebrotherhoods were not subsequently asked to accept wage cuts,
but in 1922 the Labor Board, acting upon petition from the railways,
authorized a second cut in wages or abridgment of favorable rules,
adversely affecting the interests of other classes of employees, notably
the shop crafts and trackmen.
That order, which brought down the wages of the shop crafts approxi-
mately to the scale of March, 1920, and took away the increases of June
in that year, precipitated one of the most extensive, serious, and pro-
tracted strikes in railway history.Acting against the findings of the
Labor Board, the shopmen refused to accept the cut and walked out on
July 1, 1922, the date on which the lower rates were to become effective.
The strike was directed not only against the wage reduction but also
against the growing practice of some companies to give their equipment
repair work to outside shops not subject to Labor Board rulings, and
against the negative attitude of railway managers toward national
adjustment boards.
The shopmen's strike was a failure and it cost them much in impaired
prestige.A minority of the roads entered into a compromise agreement,
influenced in part by the desire of the managers to get back their experi-
enced employees to take the place of the inefficient strikebreakers, and
in part by the desire of the labor leaders to prevent further damage to
union prestige.On those roads, the strikers, when taken back without
sacrifice of seniority rights, accepted the Labor Board rates, but, on the
majority of the railroads, new shopmen were recruited and retained,
and the number of strikers taken back eventually as new employees was
but a small proportion of those who walked out.One indirect benefit
to the shopmen was the abandonment of the policy of contract repairs
in outside shops, but, in the matter of adjustment boards, the effect was
to foster the organization of such boards on a system basis and to bring
into being many "company unions" of shopmen unaffihiated with the
national unions.
The policies of the Railroad Labor Board in connection with the
shopmen's strike, its apparent inability to cope with the problem of
adjustment boards (in the meantime having itself to pass upon a large
volume of small disputes which should have been handled by adjust-
ment boards), its failure to command full respect from either party,
and a general belief on the part of the public that the Board was not
functioning effectively, led to an agitation for its abolishment.Friction
within the Board itself (between the representatives of labor and of the
public) had no small part in the final outcome, but aôtion was precipitated
by the refusal of enginemen and firemen in western territory to obey a
summons to appear before the Board and to take part in the hearings on
a wage issue properly before the Board for determination.Subsequently,
the employees refused to abide by the Board's decision amending certain282 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
rUles, and by strike threat coerced the railways into agreeing to a wage
increase without amendment of rules.Refusal to abide by findings of
the Board was not confined to employees, as one important carrier in
eastern territory insisted upon carrying out a policy of employee repre-
sentation contrary to Board ruling, and carried the issue into the courts.
The decision was that the Board had no legal power to enforce its orders.
In a few other cases the rulings of the Board were not observed by the
carriers, notably in the prolonged continuance of the subterfuge of
"farming out" maintenance work by contract to outside companies,
virtually subsidiaries of the carriers, so as to place the employees affected
outside the jurisdiction of the Board.That unethical procedure was
eventually abandoned, but it was continued long enough to justify labor
in asserting that defiance of the Board was practiced by the carriers as
well as by the labor organizations, and that the blame for thus impairing
the usefulness of the Board must be assumed in part by railroad
On the part of railway managers, the attitude of the majority was
that the Board should be continued and strengthened by an amendment
to the law giving it further powers, but as there appeared to be no
likelihood that Congress would enact strengthening legislation, in view of
labor opposition to the Board, no definite concerted stand was taken.
On the part of employees, the principal objection to the Board was
against the public members who held the balance of power and who were
regarded, unfairly perhaps, as antagonistic to labor.
Efforts were made by labor in 1925 to enact the Howell-Barkley Bill
with its "closed shop" principle, and the bill was almost enacted. *
Alarmedat the prospect of passage of such a law, and realizing that
under the existing political conditions the Railroad Labor Board would
not be continued, the railway executives sought a compromise which
would give to labor the principal objectives it sought and yet would
avoid the drastic proposals of the Howell-Barkley Bill.The results
of joint conferences were embodied in the Watson-Parker Bill, introduced
in January, 1926, and enacted in May, 1926.
An unusual feature of that legislation, dealing as it does with highly
controversial matters, was the unanimity of support.The bill was
advocated not only by the railway labor unions but also by a large
majority of railway executives, and its passage was recommended by
the President. opposition, never formidable, was confined to
*Itshould be understood that the railway unions do not practise the "closed
shop" in the sense in which that term is used by most well-informed students of
labor relations—in other words, they do not ask the employer to agree to employ
no nonunion men.The Howell Barkley bill merely embodied a plan to conduct
labor relations through the standard national labor organizations, as opposed to
the "company unions" established by employers.—Note by George Soule, Director.TIM NSPOR TA TION 283
a few representatives of manufacturers and shippers, who feared collusion
between management arid labor to increase wages and the.n to advance
rates, and to a small minority of railway executives who insisted that the
bill was wrong in principle and a compromise which would react unfavor-
ably upon the public.
The essential difference between the 1926 and the 1920 laws lies in
the elimination of public representation in the determination of wages,
and in the elimination of compulsory arbitration.The 1920 law com-
pelled arbitration but did not compel acceptance, while the 1926 law made
arbitration voluntary but provided that the arbitral awards must be
accepted.Instead of a continuing tribunal of nine men, three of whom
represented the public, with a formal procedure of public hearings,
complete records, and reported decisions, the new law has created a
Board of Mediation of five members, appointed by the President, who
may intervene in wage disputes and solely by process of mediation move
to avert trouble.The new Board has no powers in summoning witnesses
or holding public hearings, but acts solely as a peace-making body in
harmonizing differences in point of view.If unable to bring about an
amicable adjustment, the Board is required to make an effort to induce
the disputants to agree to arbitration under procedure set forth in the
law, the decision to be binding upon all parties.In the event of failure of
mediation, or unwillingness of either or both parties to arbitrate, the
Board of Mediation, if it believes that the dispute may substantially
interrupt traffic, is required to notify the President who, in his discretion,
is authorized to create a "fact-finding" emergency board to investigate
and report to him within 30 days.The law provides further for a "cool-
ing off" period.After the creation of the "fact-finding" board, and for
30 days subsequent to the date of its report, no change, except by agree-
ment, shall be made by the parties to the controversy in the conditions
out of which the dispute arose.
Since the creation of the Board of Mediation, there have been no labor
disputes which the Board could not adjust.The years 1926, 1927,
and 1928 have been free from interruptions to traffic by strikes.For
such freedom, credit belongs in part to the Board.Yet the efficacy
of mediation, arbitration, and emergency "fact-finding" has not thus
far been thoroughly tested.Since 1926, there has been a general upward
revision in wage rates without any serious dispute.The Board of Media-
tion has been of service in the adjustment of differences, but in the
main the concessions have been made by the carriers.No attempt has
been made to reduce wages.'8
Inbut two cases (in May. and October, 1928) has the appointment of a "fact-
finding" emergency board been necessary.The first case involved the continuation
of substandard wage rates on a weak road which, because of peculiar conditions of
light traffic, could hardly meet its operating expenses.A strike was ordered to enforce284 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
Some critics have contended that the railway executives have been
too willing to concede to organized pressure for higher wages and more
favorable rules affecting employment, and that, by concerted and firm
resistance, they might have made better bargains with their employees
and thereby held down operating expenses which the public must pay in
transportation charges.Such criticism, however, overlooks the prime
obligation of management to provide continuous service to the public.
Ill feeling engendered by strife would react quickly on transportation
service, and strikes would be highly demoralizing.Public opinion in
crises of that kind is not likely to side with the corporations.Except
in isolated and unimportant cases, the wages of railway workers cannot
be said to be too generous.The high grade of transportation service
since 1923 has increased the public goodwill toward railways, an asset
not lightly to be jeopardized.The morale of the service in 1928, in
contrast with that of 1920, has been high, and the employees and manage-
ment have co-operated in increasing operating efficiency.
TABLE 13.—EMPLOYEES ANDTHEIRCOMPENSATION, CLASS I RAILWAYS,1920TO
1927,INCLUSIVEO
Average compensation
AverageTotal hours Hours perTotal corn-
______________________




1920 2,022,8325,446,741 2,693 3,681,801 5.676 $1,820
1921 1,659,5134,147,319 2,4992,765,218 .667 1,666
1922 1,626,8344,311,897 2,650 2,640,817 .613 1.623
1923 1,857,6744,928,651 2,6533,004,072 .610 1,617
1924 1,751,3624,534,879 2,5892,825,775 .623 1,613
1925 1,744,3114,531,361 2,598 2,860,600 .631 1,840
1926 1,779;2754,671,736 2,626 2,946,114 .631 1,656
1927 1,734,4704,517,694 2,605 2,909,217 .644 1,677
Thetotal compensation includes overtime and other pay roll allowances, The number of
employees is the average of quarterly counts. The statistics include general officers as well as all
others on railroad pay rolls.The average yearly compensation is subject to qualification as to the
count of employees, but as the same basis was used in each year the comparison i8 at least
indicative.
The average number of employees, their aggregate annual compen-
sation, and the average yearly compensation per employee are shown
in Table 13.The tendency in average hourly and yearly compensation
the demand for standard wages but the order was suspended when the emergency
board was appointed, and its report in favor of a continuation of substandard wages
(previously approved by the abolished Labor Board) assisted in effecting a compromise
between the management and its employees.The second case was a dispute between
the western railways and their conductors and trainmen, over the of a wage
increase and its relation to certain restrictive rules.The differences were settled after
the publication of a report by the fact-finding board.TRANSPORTATION 285
was downward from 1920 to 1923, and since then the tendency has been
upward.It is interesting to note that, although the volume of freight
traffic in 1926 was nearly 8 per cent greater than in 1923, the number of
employees was 7 per cent less and the number of man-hours was 8 per
cent less.The year 1920 was abnormal, as it was affected by influences
carried over from the period of Federal control.
It may be of interest here to utilize a• summary, prepared by the
Bureau of Railway Economics, showing the distribution of railway
operating revenues.The item of labor (salaries and wages) is, of course,
the largest in the group.In 1920, labor was paid 55.4 cents out of each
dollar of operating revenues.In 1921, the proportion had dropped to
46.9 cents, and since then the tendency has been downward: 44.4 cents
in 1922, 44.3 cents in 1923 and 1924, 43.2 cents in 1925, 42.6 cents in
1926, and 43.9 cents in 1927.The smaller part of revenues taken by
wages was influenced by the improved operating efficiency, elsewhere
discussed.
The improvement in efficiency may be shown by comparing the
total employee hours with the total traffic units.Although the practice
of computing such units, by adding to the ton-miles a multiple of the
passenger-miles, is open to some objection, it is not improper to use it
here.The commission in rate cases has occasionally employed the
basis of considering one passenger-mile as equivalent to three ton-miles
(roughly proportional with revenue).On that basis, the number of
traffic units per man-hour in 1920 and 1921 was 101.In 1922, it was
103; in 1923, 107; in 1924, 109; in 1925, 115; in 1926 (the high record);
118; and in 1927, with somewhat less traffic, 117.These figures indicate
that the output per man-hour in 1926 was 17 per cent more than in 1920
and 10 per cent more than in 1923.The larger part of the increased
productivity per man-hour is attributable to better equipment and more
adequate facilities, but the record would not have been as favorable
without the improvement in morale and degree of employee co-operation.1°
VII. CHANGES IN INDEXES OF OPERATING EFFICIENCY
A comparison of the operating statistics of 1927 and 1928 with those
of the first years of the postwar period reveals striking gains in railway
operating efficiency.In nearly every index of equipment utilization,
train and terminal operation, and output per man-hour, the improve-
ments are notable.These improvements, and the related public benefits
in a higher quality of transportation service, are attributable in part to
the large expenditures for additions and betterments to facilities and
equipment, in part to changes in operating methods and better managerial
SeeProductivity per Worker, Chap. II, Industry, Part 1, p. 81; Part 2, pp. 98,
103, 142, 164; Chap. III, Construction, p. 248; Chap. VI, Labor, p. 447; Chap.
VII, Management, pp. 512—513.286 RECENT ECONOMiC CHANGES
control, in part to higher employee morale, and in part to a better under-
standing and more cordial co-operation on the part of the shipping public.
Freight Car Performance.—The fact has already been touched upon
that there have been few net additions to the number of freight cars, and
an actual decrease in the number of locomotives since the war period.
In 1920, the equipment was inadequate to take care of traffic demands,
as there were car shortages, congestions, embargoes, and other serious
interruptions.In 1926, however, when the total revenue ton-miles were
8 per cent more than in 1920, there was complete freedom from car short-
age and congestion, and the quality of public service was never higher.
The best index of freight car utilization is net ton-miles per car-
day.In it are combined the carload, the miles per car-day, and the
per cent loaded of total car-miles.Since the total number of cars—
serviceable in use, serviceable stored, and unserviceable—is taken as the
divisor, the net ton-miles per car-day should be greatest in periods of
heavy traffic, unless the volume is so heavy as to cause congestion, or other
factors (such as delays in loading and unloading, light carloads, or a
high percentage of empty car-miles) interfere with the usual efficiency
in car utilization.
TABLE 14.—FREIGHT CAR PERFORMANCE, CLASS I RAILWAYS, 1920 TO 1927,
INCLUSIVE
AverageCar-miles Ton-miles Total net, Tons perPer cent Year . carson per per ton-miles . , loadedcar,loaded line dailycar-day car-day
MillionsThousands
1920 440,125 2,464 25.1 20.3 67.9 498
1921 344,343 2,425 22.4 27.6 63.0 389
1922 375,617 2,429 23.5 26.0 67.2 424
1923 457,500 2,461 27.8 27.9 65.7 509
1924 420,453 2,486 26.9 27.0 65.1 472
1925 456,265 2,527 28.3 27.0 64.5 493
1926 488,578 2,518 30.4 27.4 63.7 532
1927 474,683 2,509 30.3 27.2 62.9 518
1928". 397,369 2,481 32.0 26.6 63.3 525
Nors.—Total net ton-miles include nonrevenue as wellasrevenuefreight; cars online daily include
privatelinecars.
°First10 months.
The figures in Table 14 show the relation between traffic volume and
net ton-miles per car-day.The high record of 1926 (532 net ton-miles
per car-day) was made in the year of greatest traffic.The two factors,
however, are interdependent.The record volume of traffic could not
have been moved if cars had not been efficiently utilized, nor could the
high record in ton-mile production per car have been attained with less
traffic, since the divisor—the number of cars—is fairly constant.This
interrelation must be considered in passing judgment on car performance.TRANSPORTATION •287
•It will be noted that the principal improvement has been in car-miles
per car-day.The better movement is the result of less delay in yards
and terminals, less time taken by shippers and consignees for loading and
unloading, better distribution through control by the American Railway
Association, and an increase in train speed.In the factor last named,
the gain has not been so much in the actual speed while in motion as
in the reduction of road delays.The running speed is probably little,
if any, faster than in the previous years, but the increase in multiple running
tracks, the better design of locomotives, the installation of additional
automatic signals, and the. enlargement of yards and terminals have
materially cut down stand-by losses on the roads and have favorably
affected the over-all train speed between terminals.
When the railway executives in 1923 set for themselves certain objec-
tives to be attained, they named 30 miles per car-day and 30 tons per
loaded car.The miles per car-day in 1923 were 27.8, but previously
the average had been considerably lower.The 30 miles per day objective
was reached in 1926, and has since continued, even with less traffic.The
carload objective has not been attained, and the tendency is toward a
smaller average load.It was 27.9 tons in 1923, when the 30-ton objective
was set, but in no subsequent year has the 1923 load been maintained.
It was 27.4 tons in 1926, 27.2 tons in 1927, and 26.6 tons during the first
ten months of 1928.The smaller carload is the result of the changing
purchasing habits under conditions which call for smaller but more
rapidly moving inventories.It is also the result of the tendency in
freight classification changes to establish lower weights minimum for which
car-load rates apply.
The per cent borne by loaded car-miles to total car-miles has an
important bearing upon car performance.Table 14 shows a steady
decline in that unit since 1922.It was low in 1921, because of the abnor-
mal movement of empties to the owning road, in the process of "unscram-
bling" cars used with virtual disregard of ownership during Federal
control.Since then, the decline has been steady and consistent—from
67.2 per cent in 1922 to 62.9 per cent in 1927, with a slight increase to
63.3 per cent in the first ten months of 1928.This loss in efficiency is
one item of expense in improving public service, as the growing per cent
of empty mileage is brought about in part by orders from the American
Railway Association's Division of Car Service, which has power to require
the distribution of cars in advance of territorial and seasonal needs,
and in part by a slightly higher proportion of freight in cars of special
design, which invariably move empty on the return trip.The cross-
hauling of empties from one section to another section of the country
is now being done to a greater extent than formerly.While it reduces
the per cent loaded of total, that disadvantage is more than offset by
having the cars where they are needed when they are needed and thereby288 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
avoiding the delay which ensues when shippers are obliged to wait for
suitable cars.
An analysis of comparative car performance in 1923 and 1927 is
interesting.The net ton-miles of 1927 were about 4 per cent greater
than in 1923, and the freight cars on line daily were about 2 per cent
greater.The 1927 average daily movement per freight car increased
about 9 per cent, but the average load declined 2.5 per cent, and there
was a loss of 4.3 per cent in loaded car-miles.The net result of these
changes was an increase of about 2 per cent in net ton-miles per car-day,
as the gain in car-miles per car-day was greater than the losses in the
carload and per cent of loaded miles.20In this factor in car performance,
railway management has made a distinctly creditable gain.The loss
in the average carload is largely beyond railway control, and the decline
in the per cent loaded of total car-miles is one element in the price of
improved public service.
Locomotive Performance.—In locomotive utilization, the only avail-
able statistical information is the average miles per locomotive-day.As
in the case of freight cars, the divisor is the total number of locomotives—
serviceable in use, serviceable stored, and unserviceable.The average
miles per locomotive-day, therefore, other factors remaining unchanged,
would be greatest when traffic is heavy and all serviceable locomotives
are utilized, and least when traffic is light and part of the serviceable
locomotives are stored.In 1921, a year of low traffic volume, the average
per freight locomotive-day was 49.9 miles.In 1922, it was 52 miles, and
in 1923 it was 60.3 miles.Since then, there has been little change, but the
tendency is upward—61.8 miles in 1926 and 60.9 miles in 1927.The
improvement may be attributed in part to the factors which affect train
operation (next to be discussed), in part to the general practice of increas-
ing the length of the locomotive run, and in part to expenditures devoted
to the improvement of engine terminals and shops.In passenger service,
the increase in miles per locomotive-day is slightly greater than in freight
service—108.7 miles in 1923 and 114.4 miles in 1927.
Freight Train Performance.—In freight train service, the significant
units are (a) the gross train load, (b) the net train load, (c) the average
train speed between terminals, and (d) the gross ton-miles per train-hour.
The data for the years 1920 to 1927, inclusive, are given in Table 15.
In every year since 1921, the train load, both gross and net, has
shown an increase.In every year, except 1923, the train speed has
20Ifthe carload and the per cent of loaded miles had been the same in 1927 as in
1923, the higher car-miles per car day of 1927 could have released 267,000 cars. had
additional traffic called for them.Under traffic conditions at present an increase of
one mile in the average car-miles per car day is equivalent to releasing approximately
100,000 cars, or conversely, a ioss of one mile per car day is equivalent to taking
100,000 cars out of service.TRANSPORTATION 289





Year miles per miles per
Gross tonsNet tons hour train-hour
1920 1,443 708 10.3 14,876
1921 1,435 651 11.5 .16,555
1922 1,466 677 11.1 16,211
1923 1,539 713 10.9 16,768
1924 1,583 715 11.5 18,261
1925 1,670 .744 11.8 19,679
1926 1,737 772 11.9 20,705
1927 1,780 778 12.3 21,945
1928a. 1,839 793 12.8 23,623
N0TE.—Gross and net tons include nonrevenue freight.Gross tons include the weight of both cars
and contents.Nettons include the weight of contents only.
aFirst10 months of 1928.
gained.The most notable improvement is in gross ton-miles per train-
hour, an increase from 16,555 in 1921 to 21,945 in 1927, a gain of nearly
33 per cent in six years.The performance during the first 10 months
of 1928 was substantially, better than in the same period of 1927.
Gross ton-miles per train-hour, as a unit of freight train performance,
combines the factors of load and speed.While the trainload in itself
is significant, it must be considered together with train speed, as gains in
loading may be offset by losses in speed when overloading causes delay.
Train expenses vary more with train-hours than with train-miles.In
the past few years greater attention has been paid to the time element,
and by reductions in road delays the train speed has been steadily
gaining with the heavier trainload.Train-miles or train-hours should
be regarded as expense; ton-miles as product.The pronounced gain
in product per unit of work (gross ton-miles per train-hour) is another
distinctly creditable achievement.
Fuel Consumption.—Because of improved locomotive design, reduc-
tions in grades and curvature, better train loading, less road delay, and
improved technique in firing, the railroads are producing more ton-miles
per ton of coal (or its equivalent in oil).2tIn 1921, the coal consumption
per 1,000 gross ton-miles22 was 162 pounds.In 1922, there was a slight
loss, as 163 pounds were burned.In 1923, the consumption was the
same as in 1921, but since then a steady improvement is shown—149
pounds in 1924, 140 pounds in 1925, 137 pounds in 1926, and 130 pounds
in 1927.During the first 10 months of 1928 it was 125 pounds.If the
1927 gross ton-miles had been produced under 1921 fuel efficiency, the
21 See Improvement in Power Plant, Chap. II, Industry, Part 2,pp. 119 et seq.;
Chap. IV, Transportation, Part 2, p. 312.
22 Including weight of locomotive and tender.290 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
fuel consumption in 1927 would have •been 19,000,000 tons more than
were actually burned.The savings were over 19 per cent.
In passenger service, the fuel consumption record is similar, but both
the degree and the absolute savings are smaller.In 1921, the fuel burned
per passenger train car-mile was 17.7 pOunds; in 1927, it was 15.4 pounds.
The actual consumption in 1927 in passenger service would have, been
about 4,335,000 tons greater if burned under 1921 efficiency.The
savings in that service were 13 per cent.The data for switch service
are not available, but it is probable that corresponding reductions were
made in that class of service.For train service alone, the 1927 fuel
costs (at per ton, the average price f.o.b. line) would have been
about $62,071,000 more if fuel had been burned with the same efficiency
as in 1921.
Unserviceable Equipment.—The greater productivity of equipment
during the past five years is due in part to higher standards of mainte-
nance.The 1923 program, to which the railway executives pledged
themselves, set among other objectives a goal of but 5 per cent unservice-
able freight cars and but 15 per cent unserviceable locomotives.At the
close of 1922, the number of freight cars out of service for repairs was
9.1 per cent of total cars, and 26.4 per cent of freight locomotives were
unserviceable.The averages by years since 1920 are shown in Table 16.




























































While the objectives have not been fully attained, the reductions in
"bad order" equipment have been substantial.Compared with 1921,
the year before the shopmen's strike, the 1927 maintenance policies
have made available for service 172,000 additional freight cars and
2,329 additional freight locomotives.The gain in passenger locomotives
was similar in degree.In 1921, the per cent of unserviceable passenger
locomotives was 22.4 per cent; in 1927 it was 16.4 per cent.TRANSPORTATION 291
CompositeIndex of Operating Efficiency.—In a review of railway
operations in 1927,23 Dr. J. H. Parmelee, Director of the Bureau of Rail-
way Economics, suggests a method of combining the several indexes of
operating efficiency in one composite unit.His method is to take each
efficiency factor separately, to compute an index number for that factor
by relating it on a percentage basis to some previous level, and then to
combine all the indexes computed for the different factors into a common
or average index.He took the following 13 factors:
1. Car-miles per car-day.
2. Net ton-miles per car-day.
3. Gross tons per train.
4. Net tons per train.
5. Gross ton-miles per train-hour.
6. Net ton-miles per train-hour.
7. Locomotive-miles per locomotive-day, freight.
8. Locomotive-miles per locomotive-day, passeng&r.
9. Percentage serviceable locomotives, freight.
10. Percentage serviceable locomotives, passenger.
11. Percentage serviceable freight cars.
12. Fuel consumption per unit, freight.
13. Fuel consumption per unit, passenger.
Using the composite averages of the years 1920—1924 as the base of
100, he found that the composite averages of subsequent years were as
follows: 1924, 104.8; 1925, 109.4; 1926, 113.5; and 1927, 115.2.
While his method may be questioned because it gives equal weight
to each single factor and because some of the factors are elements in
other factors (such as 1 and 2), nevertheless the comparison in a general
way is sound and indicates that the year 1927, even with less traffic than
that of 1926, reflected a further gain in operating efficiency—a gain of
15.2 per cent over the average of 1920 to 1924, inclusive.
Purchasing and Stores Administration.—While railways,unlike
manufacturers and merchants, do not carry large inventories in raw
materials and merchandise, they do have substantial sums of capital
tied up continuously in fuel and other material and supplies for mainte-
nance, train operation, and construction.In 1920, the balance sheet
for all railways considered as one system carried an item of $767,266,510,
representing material and supplies held for use.In each succeeding year,
except 1923, there was a decrease.In 1927, the item was $532,063,111,
a reduction of $235,203,399.Part of the decrease was due to lower prices,
but the major savings were attributable to improvements in purchasing
policies and storekeeping.The railways themselves are taking advantage
of better transportation service and have found, like manufacturers and
merchants, that rail service has so improved in regularity and dependa-
bility that smaller stocks of supplies may be carried without fear of
23RailwayAge, January 7, 1928.292 RECENT. ECONOMIC CHANGES
interruption to maintenance work.The carrying charges on a dollar
of surplus material are around 16 cents (6 per cent for interest and 10
per cent for depreciation, obsolescence, taxes, and insurance).That
percentage, applied to a saving of $235,203,399 in surplus material,
indicates that operating expenses and other costs for material held for
use were $37,632,000 less in 1927 than in 1920.While a part of the
saving is the result of lower prices, the estimated savings are indicative
also of the success of efforts to improve the administration of purchases
and stores.24
Operating Revenues and Expenses.—In order that attention may
be drawn to certain features of the income account, the revenues, expenses,
taxes, and net operating income of Class I railways are given in condensed
form in Table 17.25
Including uncollectible operating revenues and miscellaneous operations
24 See Size of Inventory, Chap. III, Construction, pp. 235, 242; Chap. V, Market-
ing, pp. 332, 344, 350; Chap. VII, Management, pp. 508 et seq.; 537.
25 The tabulation begins with the year 1921 because the year 1920 was affected so
much by abnormal conditions (the closing two months of Federal control, six months
of guarantee period, and four months of complete corporate control) that it is not suit-
able as a base for comparison.The year 1921 also is not entirely satisfactory as a
starting point, as it was adversely affected by business depression and subnormal
traffic.
TABLE 17.—REvENUES, EXPENSES, and NET OPERATING INCOME,
1921 TO 1927
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Since 1921, there have been two peaks in
revenues, the first in 1923 and the second in
as the high record.Neither peak was
the curve of railway operating
1926.The latter now stands
notably pronounced—fromTRANSPORTATION 293
$5,517,000,000in1921to $6,290,000,000 in 1923, an increase of 14 per
cent and to $6,383,000,000in1926, a further increase of 2 per cent over
1923, or an extreme range of but 16 per cent between the lowest and
highest earnings of the seven-year period.
The degree of fluctuation in operating expenses was even less.The
expenses of 1923 were but 7 per cent gr.eater than in 1921, although
revenues were 14 per cent better.The expenses of 1926, with additional
revenues of 2 per cent, were 5 per cent less than in 1923.Since 1924,
operating expenses have been fairly constant, the extreme range being
from $4,508,000,000 in 1924 to $4,669,000,000 in 1926.In 1927, they
were but 0.2 per cent more than in 1921, although the revenues were
11 per cent greater and the ton-miles (Table 10) were 38 per cent greater.
The loss in passenger business and the reduction in freight rates explain
the difference between the relative changes in revenues and ton-miles.
The growth in the burden of taxation is noticeable.In the seven-year
period, the increase in taxes was from $276,000,000 to $376,000,000, or 36
per cent.
The changes in net railway operating income, and their relation
to property investment, will be discussed later.






Other 8.2 8.8 8.6 8.6 8.5 8.5 8.6
Total 100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0100.0
OPEBATING EXPENSES
Maintenance of way and structures 13.713.212.913.413.313.614.1
Maintenance of equipment 22.722.523,321.320.520,119.9
Transportation 40.838.536.736.234.834.034.6
Other 5.5 5.2 4,9 5.3 5.5 5.4 5.9
Total 82.779.477,876.174.173.174.6
Taxes 5.05.45.35.75.96.16.1
Joint facility and equipment rents, net debita....1.31.51.61.71.71.81.9
Netrailway operating income 11.013.715.316.418.319.017.4
Including uncollectible operating revenues and miscellaneous operations.
The changing relationships between the principal classes of traffic
and total reveiiues, and between the principal groups of operating
expenses and total, as well as the relationships between expenses, taxes,
and net operating income and gross revenues are depicted in Table 18.
Under operating revenues, the notable change is in the relative pro-
portions of freight revenue and revenue from the sale of passenger294 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
tickets.In 1921, freight revenue was 70.9 per cent and passenger revenue
20.9 per cent of the total.The freight proportion has steadily increased
and the passenger proportion has steadily decreased in each year, so
that in 1927 the percentages of total were 75.5 and 15.9, respectively.
All other revenues combined show practically no relative change—8.2
per cent in 1921 and 8.6 per cent in 1927.
The proportion of revenues taken by expenses has shown a distinctly
downward tendency—from 82.7 per cent in 1921 to 74.6 per cent in 1927.
The lowest point was in 1926, when the operating ratio was 73.1 per cent.26
Among the general accounts, the principal reduction in the ratio is found
in transportation expenses—40.8 per cent of revenues in 1921 and
34.6 per cent in 1927—although a smaller reduction is noted also in equip-
ment maintenance. A comparison with earlier periods would show that
the two maintenance accounts have been constituting a larger part of the
whole during the past two decades, especially the equipment maintenance
group.The explanation is that the capital expenditures yield their
greatest return in reduction in transportation expenses, but tend to
increase the burden upon maintenance.The transportation savings are
greater than the added maintenance costs, and the net result is a decrease
in the total operating ratio.
In view of rate reductions in 1922 and subsequently, and the advances
in wage rates in the past three or four years, the reduction in the operating
ratio, especially in transportation expenses, reflects credit upon operating
management.
VIII. CHANGES IN RAILWAY NET INCOME
The Transportation Act of 1920 placed upon the Interstate Commerce
Commission the duty of establishing rates so that the railways as a whole,
or as a whole in territorial groups, under honest and efficient operation,
may earn, "as nearly as may be," a fair return on the value of property
held for and used in the service of transportation.Valuation was to be
determined by the Commission according to procedure under way since
1914, and for the first two years the fair return was defined as per
cent plus an additional one-half of 1 per cent, in the discretion of the
commission, "to make provision in whole or in part for improvements,
betterments, or equipment...chargeableto capital account."
The rate advances of 1920 were intended by the Commission to yield
net railway operating income equal to 6 per cent on an aggregate
value of $18,900,000,000.The Commission estimated that sum by
applying to the railway total book costs the percentage which the
Commission's tentative valuation of approximately one-quarter of the
26 In the first 10 months of 1928, the operating ratio was 72.64 per cent or 1.32 points
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railways bore to the book costs of those properties.In effect, that method
wrote down the railway book costs about 5 per cent.
While the Commission's rate increase order was made with the inten-
tion of yielding 6 per cent on the estimated value, the actual return was
less than one-half of 6 per cent, as the traffic and gross earnings of 1921
fell off sharply.It was hoped that with a revival of business the 1920
rates would yield the desired return in later years, but they have not
done so.Since 1920, as has already been noted, freight rates as a whole
have been reduced.In 1922, after the expiration of the two-year period
in which the 6 per cent maximum return was contemplated, the Com-
mission, acting under a provision of the law requiring it periodically to
set the fair return to conform to changing conditions, found that the fair
return from that time should be per cent without any additional
allowance for capital expenditures from income.No change has since
been made.The law imposed upon the the obligation in
determining the rate of return to "give due consideration, among other
things, to the transportation needs of the country and the necessity
(under honest, efficient, and economical management of existing trans-
portation facilities) of enlarging such facilities in order to provide 'the
people of the [Jnited States with adequate transportation."
In the opinion of the Commission, a return of percent on value
is adequate to serve the purpose which Congress had in mind, that is,
to permit railways to earn, under honest and efficient management,
sufficient net income to sustain their credit, and to obtain capital as needed
on reasonable terms to enlarge facilities so as to furnish the public with
adequate service.Yet in no year since the Transportation Act was
passed have the railways as a whole earned as much as per cent on
value.The public, during the past four years, has been furnished with
adequate rail service, largely as a result of capital expenditures devoted
to enlargement of facilities and betterment of equipment, but these
capital expenditures have been made in a hope, thus far unrealized, t.hat
the spirit of the law which promises a fair return would be carried out
by the Commission.This is not to say that the low earning power of
railways may be remedied entirely by rate increases, as higher rates
might stifle business activity and further diminish railway net income,
but the fact remains that the net return on the value of railway property
has been plainly inadequate since 1920, and unless that return is bettered
the carriers may be unable to continue to enlarge their facilities to keep
pace with traffic demands.If that time comes, the people of the United
States will not then be furnished with adequate transportation.
The Commission does not publish the annual return on valuation,
and may not do so until their valuation work iscomplete.In the absence
of the total official valuation figures from the Commission, the railway
book costs may be taken, subject to the qualification that in 1920 they296 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
were roughly 5 per cent in excess of the tentative base then used by the
Commission in the rate advance case.The rate of return annually from
1920 to 1927 is given in Table 19.The railway value includes working
capital in cash and material and supplies, as well as the investment in
road and equipment for Class I roads and their nonoperating subsidiaries.
Net railway operating income is what is left out of operating revenues
after payment of operating expenses, taxes, and net debit balances for
joint facility rents and hire of equipment.It is the amount left to pay
interest charges on funded and other debt, rentals for leased lines, other
charges, and dividends—in other words, the net amount which may be
considered as a reward to the total capital invested, and the basis which
should be used in computing the rate of return on investment as a whole.
TABLE 19.—NET RAILWAY OPERATING INCOME AND RETURN ON INVESTMENT, CLASS
I RAILWAYS AND THEIR NONOPERATING SUBSIDIARIES, 1921 TO 1927















































































Report of Bureau of Railway Economics.
Even with a liberal allowance for the difference between the railway
book cost and the valuation that the Interstate Commerce. Commission
may finally fix for rate-making purposes, the return in the seven years
since the enactment of the new .ruleof rate making is markedly inade-
quate.For the seven years, the average return on the investment
was but 4.3 per cent.The aggregate net railway operating income of
the seven years was $2,277,000,000 less thanper cent on the invest-
ment, a deficiency of. $325,000,000 per year.
The question may be asked: "Why have the railways continued,
during the past three or four years, to invest such large additional sums
when the return on the investment as a whole has been so meager?"An
adequate answer requires consideration of the background of the present
situation.When the extensive program of improvements was under-
taken in 1922 and 1923; as a deliberate policy of the Association of
Railway Executives, they had the more or less definite, promise in theTRANSPORTATION 297
Transportation Act that the railways, as a whole or regionally, would be
permitted to earn a fair return.At that tim,e the policy of the Interstate
Commerce Commission in interpreting the new rule of rate making had
not been developed, except initially in 1920, and there was abundant
reason to hope, if not confidently to expect, that the mandate of Congress
would be observed.In other words, the.inadequate returns of 1922 and
1923 might have been regarded as merely transitional and one form of
the pains of economic readjustment.Since then, the net inéome as a
whole has been substantially below a fair return and the prospects of
improving it are not encouraging, notably since the passage of the Hoch-
Smith resolution which in effect directs the Commission to reduce rates
on the commodities affected when there is evidence of a depression in
an industry.While that resolution was intended specifically to afford
preferential treatment to agricultural products, the Commission apparently
is giving it broader interpretation, as in the Lake Cargo Case, when,
because of a depression in the coal industry in the northern field, lower
rates to lake ports were approved and the southern fields were not
similarly favored.Reductions in rates under the Hoch-Smith resolution
are to be made only when not inconsistent with existing law.The
railroad net return as a whole is not consistent with the policy of the 1920
act, yet further rate reductions have been ordered and proposals to
increase other rates have been held up.
One partial answer to the question may be that some of the funda-
mental issues of valuation and rate making are yet to be determined by
the Supreme Court, and there is faith that a satisfactory solution will
be found when that body speaks.Another partial answer is that the
railways have faith in the ultimate fairness of the public and the Govern-
ment, and hope for an eventual change in policy more favorable to the
carriers.Such a change would not come about without public goodwill
toward railways, and public goodwill could not be held without good
service.To give good service, the additional facilities and better equip-
ment are essential.
The most complete answer to the question lies, probably, in the fact
that the additional capital expenditures were intended not only to pro-
vide adequate transportation but also to produce it more economically.
The new capital, taken by itself, is probably earning more than a fair
return in operating economies, even though the net income as a whole is
less than a fair return on the entire investment.The return on the total
investment might be even lower if the new capital were withheld.It
is a case of investing additional money to protect the larger sums previ-
ously invested.
One effect of inadequate income has been to spur railway manage-
ment to do its utmost in increasing efficiency and economy.The
Commission_is required to take these factors into account, and has broad298 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
powers to inquire .into all phases of management.Except in a few singu-
lar cases, no criticism on that score has been voiced by the Commission.
On the contrary, it has, by implication at least, given the railways as a
whole a clean bill on economical management.The facts concerning
recent improvements in operation indicate clearly that the Commission's
present policy of holding down the rate scales cannot be born of belief
that there is any general inefficiency or dishonesty in management.
As now organized financially, the railways as a whole have about 59
per cent of their capital structure in funded debt on which the average
interest rate is now about 4.7 per cent.A return of percent on the
property value would give enough income to pay the 4.7 per cent interest
on the 59 per cent of capitalization in bonds and leave divisible income
equivalent to 7.3 per cent dividend upon the 41 per cent of capitalization
in stock, provided, of course, that the total capitalization were not greater
than property value.As a matter of fact, the railway net capitalization
is less than the book investment value.The total investment in road
and equipment (all roads) in 1927 (not including working capital in cash
and materials held for use) was $24,453,870,938.The gross capitaliza-
tion was $23,614,325,858, but that capitalization included $5,477,634,413
in securities owned by the railways themselves, leaving a net capitaliza-
tion of $18,136,691,445 in the hands of the public, a sum six billions less
than the total investment in road and equipment.
Consideration must be given also to the fact that the net income from
which dividends are declared comes not only from railroad operations
but also from outside investments.In many cases these are substantial.
Such investments are not included in the railway value (investment in
road and equipment) upon which the fair return is computed, nor are the
returns included in net railway operating income.Yet the income from
outside investments is an addition to the railway income available for
dividends on railway stock,
To these factors, which explain why the dividends recently paid upon
railway stocks are higher than the rate of return on railway investment,
may be added one additional factor.A substantial part of the total
railway stocks have received no dividends for years.In 1927 the non-
dividend stock was 30 per cent of the total.The proportion of such
stock is decreasing.In 1921 it was 43 per cent.
Table 20 gives the dividend rates and the interest rates on funded
debt, 1920 to 1927, inclusive.The average rate of interest is not reported
by the Interstate Commerce Commission, but has been approximated
here by taking the par value of outstanding funded debt and relating it
to the actual interest payments on funded debt.
While the figures in Table 20 reflect fairly satisfactory dividend rates
on dividend-paying ètock, the rate on all stock (including theper cent
on which dividends were not paid) is not sufficient to justify investorsTRANSPORTATION 299
TABLE20.—DIVIDENDS ON CAPITAL STOCK AND INTEREST RATE ON FUNDED DEBT,
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Class I railways only.
bIncreaseover 1920 caused almost entirely by stock dividends.
in risking additional capital in railway stocks except those of the strong
companies.
The per cent of dividend-paying stocks has been increasing steadily
since 1921.The 1927 per cent, 70.25, is the highest on record.The
degree of insolvency (indicated by railway mileage in the hands of
receivers) also has shown an improvement.In 1921, the mileage was
13,512, owned by 68 companies.In 1927, the mileage was 16,752, owned
by 40 companies, but since then the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul
Railway (the only large system in the list) has been reorganized, and
the receivers have been discharged.Deducting the mileage of that road
from the 1927 total, leaves 6,569 miles, or about one-half of the 1921 total.
IX. CONSOLIDATION AND UNIFICATION
The Transportation Act of 1920 requires the Interstate Commerce
Commission to prepare a plan for the consolidation of all railways into
a limited number of systems, and the intent of the law is that such consoli-
dations shall be brought about, so that, instead of many railroads of
varying degrees of earning power and financial strength, there shall be
but a few of fairly equal strength.It is provided that in such groupings
competition shall be preserved as fully as practicable, and that the existing
routes and channels of traffic shall not be unduly disturbed.
The Commission has followed the instructions of Congress up to the
point of publishing its final plan.It has drafted and published its
tentative plan, has held extended hearings, considered numerous pro-
posals, and built up a voluminous record, but the final plan has not yet
been formulated.In fact, its chairman in 1927 admitted, in hearings
before Congressional committees on proposed amendments to the law,
that the task is too difficult and that the Commission would like to be300 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
relieved of preparing a final plan.As an alternative, the Commission
supports the proposal that consolidations, on correct principles and
subject to its approval, should be allowed to take place naturally and
voluntarily, as in the past, instead of an advance grand-scale determi-
nation of a comprehensive scheme to which all proposals must conform.
The Parker Bill to permit such voluntary consolidations, subject to
commission approval, came near to enactment in the spring of 1928, and
is iikely to be reintroduced in 1929.
As the matter now stands, no consolidation of railway properties may
be made without Commission approval, and no proposal may be approved
unless it is in harmony with the final plan which the Commission has
not yet prepared.As a consequence, no consolidation has taken place
the 1920 law was passed, and none can take place until the final
plan is published or the law is changed.There have been, however, a
few so-called unifications by lease or stock control.The COmmission
is empowered to approve combinations short of actual consolidation, when
in the public interest.Several proposals of that kind have been acted
upon, and a few are now before the Commission.Until the present law
ischanged to permit piecemeal and voluntary consolidations, with
adequate protection to the weak lines and the general public, little
progress toward systematic consolidation can be made.
The principal object of consolidation is to simplify the problems of
regional rate-making.As has already been mentioned, the law provides
that rates shall be set for the railways as a whole in a territorial region,
so that the railways in that region may earn a fair return on their aggre-
gate value.The treatment is by groups, not by individual roads.
Competitive freight rates inaregion are necessarily the same on each
competing road.Where distance class-rates apply in freight service, the
mileage rate is uniform.Passenger mileage rates are, with few excep-
tions, the same on all roads in a region.If these uniform rates are
determined by the income needs of all of the roads in a region considered
as one system, it necessarily follows that the rates so determined will
yield more than a fair return to the strong and less than a fair return to
the weak.The real problem is the protection of the weak road.The
strong roads are partially held in check by the recapture clause of the
1920 law, under which one-half of net income in excess of 6 per cent on
value is taken by the Government, but no provision is made for compen-
sating the poor roads which earn less than the fair return.If the
number of roads in each region were reduced, the weak lines parceled
out to the strong, and a new alignment perfected which would give
approximately equal strength to each of the few large systems to be
organized, then the uniform rate scales would yield approximately the
same rate of return to each and the problem of the weak road would
disappear.TRANSPORTATION 301
While simplification of rate control may be regarded as the prime
objective of consolidation, there are likely to be other advantages in
unification of terminals, more efficient use of equipment and facilities,
and economies of other kinds through elimination of duplication of effort.
But these economies are likely to be overestimated, and in any specific
case there will always be the possibility of diminution in competition
and disturbance in transportation relationships between the many
communities served.This explains why, as a general rule, the represen-
tatives of cities and the organizations of shippers are lukewarm toward,
if not actually opposed to, the principle of consolidation.
We are here concerned only with economic changes since the war
period.So far as consolidation of railway properties is concerned, a
fundamental change was intended by the 1920 law, but, instead of accom-
plishing its purpose, the law has actually retarded consolidation on a
large scale by acting as a brake on the natural process of system develop-
ment by voluntary action, the process under which in earlier periods the
existing large systems have grown.
X. CHANGES IN QUALITY OF RAILWAY SERVICE
The recent. inprovement in the quality of railway service cannot be
quantitatively measured.It cannot, like gains in operating efficiency,
be expressed in definite units or percentages of change.The universal
testimony of shippers and others interested in rail transportation is that,
in the past three years and at present, the service is of a higher standard
than ever before, and the recent railway record has been favorably
commented upon by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Secretary
of Commerce, and others in high governmental positions.Secretary
Hoover, in his 1927 annual report, estimated that the rapidity of freight
transportation was then from 30 per cent to 40 per cent greater than at
the close of the war, and expressed the view that the expedition of railway
service has reacted favorably upon the entire economic structure.
Concretely, the improvement in service is seen in the relief from car
shortages, in freedom from traffic congestion, in quicker movement of
freight, and in closer adherence to scheduled transit times, thereby
insuring dependability in delivery.
The credit for better service may be given to several factors already
discussed.First in importance are the capital expenditures devoted to
enlarging and improving facilities and equipment.These, with more
effective managerial control and better employee morale, have increased
the productivity of the plant.The improvement in service, however,
would undoubtedly have been very much less had it not been for the
cordial co-operation of shippers through their Regional Advisory Boards.
These boards, the first organized early in 1923, consist entirely of pur-
chasers of transportation and are now organized on a regional basis,302 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
14 in all, with an aggregate membership of approximately 15,000, repre-
senting something like 25 million shippers and receivers of freight by
rail.They meet regularly, with railway representatives as guests, and
their committees dealing with specific commodities are constantly in
touch with railway officers.This organized co-operative effort has
resulted in a closer and more cordial and understanding relationship
between the users and the producers of transportation.Car demands
have been anticipated and provided for in advance; seasonal or unusual
movements are planned for and transportation difficulties avoided; and
the frequent contact in co-operative effort has given each side a more
complete and sympathetic understanding of common and individual
problems.It is probable that a large part of the credit for the better
utilization of freight cars should go to the shippers' advisory boards,
as well as to the better management of the railways.
In the effort to improve service, the railways have recently increased
the number of scheduled fast freight trains, and have speeded up their
movement so as to make earlier deliveries at destination.This has
been accomplished in part by the greater use of the principle of making
up trains to run through without dropping or picking up cars en route,
by establishing longer locomotive runs, .byreducing delays at inter-
divisional terminals, and by cutting down the time required at initial
and final terminals in the making up of the train and the placing of the
cars at destination.Distinct progress has been made in the operation
of classification yards, and throughout the entire train yard and terminal
service there is a new conception of the value of a minute.
The shipper of small lots of less-than-carload freight finds that a
revision of transfer points has reduced the number of handlings, as well
as the time in transit.Improvements in freight house facilities and
operating methods have reduced the stand-by losses of trucks and drays.
Amplification of car records and passing times are giving quicker and
more complete information concerning shipments in transit.Greater
pains are taken by the traffic and operating officers of the railways to
merchandise railway service.
Besides the satisfaction of having prompt and reliable rail service,
the typical manufacturer or merchant has discovered that because of
transportation dependability .he can realize real and substantial savings
by carrying smaller stocks of raw materials, finished products, or mer-
chandise.The reduction in credit demands, partial release of "frozen
assets," saving in interest charges, and loss or deterioration in inventories,
cannot be estimated with accuracy, but in the aggregate they run into
large sums.For such savings the higher grade of railway service may
be credited in substantial part.The improvement in transportation
called attention to the possibilities, and gave impetus to the recent
general improvement in inventory control.TRANSPORTATION 303
One instance was cited by Secretary of Commerce Hoover, in an
address on April 5, 1927, before the Atlantic States Shippers' Advisory
Board, when he referred to the fact that principally because of better
rail service the retail lumber dealers found that they could carry on
their business with approximately four billion less board-feet in stocks
than six years before, thereby releasing about $600,000,000 of capital
in that one industry.He mentioned, further, that one of the reasons
for the abundant capital in this country at the present time is the enor-
mous decrease in inventories, not alone in lumber but in dry goods and
in every commodity in the country.One of the reasons for stability
in price levels is the fact that goods move quickly, and there is not the
stimulus to rising prices and the pyramiding of orders that. come about
in the face of any suspension of ample transportation.
One further quotation from Mr. Hoover succinctly summarizes the
topic.The following is taken from his 1926 annual report as Secretary
of Commerce:
Probably the most outstanding single industrial accomplishment since the war has
been the reorganization of our American railways.Our transportation service was
not only demoralized by Government operation during the war but had suffered chronic
car shortages and insufficient service, not only after the war but for many years before.
The annual loss from this periodic strangulation in transportation was estimated in
the department's annual report of 1925 to amount to hundreds of millions a year.
The insufficiency of transportation interfered with steady industrial operations,
created intermittent employment, increased the cost of production, and, through
periodic strangulation, caused high prices to the consumer.Manufacturers and
distributors were compelled to carry excessive inventories as a protective measure,
thus not only increasing the amount of capital required in the business but multiplying
the danger of loss by price fluctuation.
The railways, during the past five years, not only have built up adequate service
and given complete correction to those ills, but they have, by great ability of their
managers, greatly reduced transportation costs and thus made rate reductions possible
which would not have been otherwise the case... Theresult of this great reorgani-
zation upon the whole economic fabric of the country has been far-reaching.
XI. SUMMARY
From 1920 (when railway property investment was slightly in excess
of $20,000,000,000) to 1927, inclusive, the railways have made gross
expenditures of nearly $6,000,000,000 for additions to and betterments
of facilities and equipment, an average annual expenditure of three-
quarters of a billion.Of the total sum, approximately one-half has been
devoted to roadway and structures, principally in additional running
tracks, sidings, and yards; improved terminals and structures; additional
automatic and other signaling; heavier rail; more and better ties; and
more and better ballast.The other one-half has been devoted to better-
ments of equipment.The number of equipment units shows little
change—a slight increase in freight cars but actual decreases in locomo-304 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
tives and passenger cars—but the average and the aggregate capacity
of the units have increased and, particularly in locomotives, there have
been notable improvements in design and economic effectiveness.In
the first few years of the postwar period, the expenditures for equipment
were greater than those for roadway and structures, but during the latter
part of the period the proportions have been reversed.Because of the
more effective use of equipment, the additional traffic has been handled
with the same or even less units, and orders for new locomotives and cars
have been mainly for replacement of units retired.
A little less than one-quarter of the six billions devoted to additions
and betterments has been charged to operating expenses or to the profit
and loss surplus.Such charges, in the main, represent the original cost
of property or equipment replaced or retired.Something more than
two-thirds of the six billions was added to the investment account—the
excess cost of the new over the original cost of the old.Less than one-
fifth of the six billions has been capitalized by the issue of stocks or bonds.
For the years 1920 to 1927, inclusive, the gross expenditures for additions
and betterments were $5,978,296,000; the net increase in the investment
account was $4,604,551,000; and the net increase in railway capitalization
in stocks and bonds was $1,142,761,000.These figures indicate that the
greater part of the gross expenditures for betterments and of the net
increase in investment was financed from income or surplus and has not
been capitalized.That conservative policy on the part of the railways
was not altogether one of choice, but was made necessary by the practical
inability of the typical railway to selistock, and the high rates of interest
or heavy discounts required to make the bonds marketable.An
unhealthy tendency is apparent in the growing proportion of funded
debt of total capitalization.The funded, debt proportion grew from
about 50 per cent in 1910 to 58 per cent in 1920, and to 59 per cent since
1923.
Railway freight traffic since 1920 has had a general (but slight)
upward tendency.The ton-miles of 1923 and 1926 were of record-
breaking volume.The former peak-loads were in 1918 and 1920.
Taking 1918, a war year, as 100, the successive peaks were 101 in 1920,
102 in 1923 and 1925, 109 in 1926, and 106 in 1927.The number of
loaded cars shows relatively greater increases than ton-miles, but the
loaded car unit does not take into account the tendency toward a smaller
carload.Railway passenger traffic, in contrast to the slight increase in
freight, is steadily and seriously diminishing in volume.Since 1920,
each year, with the exception of 1923, has had a smaller total passenger-
miles than the preceding year.The passenger-miles in 1927 were 28
per cent less than in 1920.The loss is almost entirely in local passengers,
and is owing mainly to motor vehicle competition.Long distance
passengers and commuters have been increasing slightly.TRANSPORTATION 305
The effect of motor truck competition on railways, while it has
diminished the volume of less-than-carload freight and has taken away
some tonnage in carload lots in a few other commodities, is not serious.
Relatively, the freight lost to trucks is a small part of the total, and it is
the least remunerative of railway freight.The small-shipment, short-
haul freight traffic is burdensome in its demands upon equipment and
facilities, and the railways are better off when the equipment and facility
capacity, released by the loss of freight to trucks, is employed for the long-
distance bulk-freight which is more attractive from the point of view of
net revenue.In railway passenger service, however, the loss in local
passengers to automobiles and motor coaches is substantial and serious,
and is narrowing the already small spread between railway passenger
revenues and passenger expenses.To meet the new form of competi-
tion, the railways are improving the schedules and equipment of the
through trains, and are entering the motor coach field themselves by
substituting motor transportation for branch-line trains or paralleling
their rail lines by motor coach service.The greatest loss to the railways,
however, is not in the passengers taken by motor coaches, but in the
greater use of the private automobile as a substitute for railway
transportation.
Shortly after the Transportation Act was passed in 1920, the Interstate
Commerce Commission, acting under the new rule of rate-making,
authorized rate increases which were intended to yield a 6 per cent return
on railway property value.The average advance in freight rates was
between 30 per cent and 35 per cent; in passenger service, the mileage
rates were increased about 18 per cent and Pullman fares were advanced
50 per cent.These heavy increases did not, however, yield 6 per cent
on property value, as the 1921 traffic fell off sharply.After the initial
attempt to adjust rates so as to yield a specified rate of return, as required
by law, the Commission apparently has given less attention to the rela-
tion between rates as a whole and fair return than to the downward
adjustment of specific rates, notably on agricultural products.The
average revenue per ton-mile in 1921 was 1.275 cents;in 1927, it was 1.080
cents.The ton-mile revenue is not always an accurate index of relative
rates, but in this case it is indicative of reductions since 1921.These
reductions, on the basis of the differences between the ton-mile revenue
of 1921 and of subsequent years up to and including 1927, have saved
the shipping public over $4,000,000,000, or at the rate of $670,00O,000 per
year.In passenger service, the rates have remained substantially the
same since the advances of 1920, although, on the one hand, the tendency
has been to offer to the public more opportunities in the form of reduced
excursion or tourist rates, and, on the other hand, there have been advances
in suburban fares in some localities.The revenue per passenger-mile
has declined from. 3.086 cents in 1921 to 2.896 cents in 1927, but the306 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
decrease has been the result not only of the greater use of excursion
tickets, but also of higher proportions of through passengers and sub-
urbanites, and of lower proportions of local passengers who travel on the
highest passenger-mile rates.
When the railways were restored to private operation after the war,
the employee morale, in common with employee morale in nearly all
industries, was seriously impaired.Relations were further strained
when the Railroad Labor Board reduced wages in 1921 and 1922, and
took away certain favorable rules, and the service was adversely affected
by a nation-wide strike of shopmen in 1922—23.The Railroad Labor
Board, created by the 1920 law, did not function satisfactorily, and it was
replaced in 1926 by a Board of Mediation.Since then, there have been
no serious labor troubles, but friction has been avoided partly by wage
advances by mutual agreement between management and employees, or
as a result of mediation.The process of mediation as a substitute for
the offices of the Railroad Labor Board (on which the public members
held the deciding vote) has not yet been subjected to a severe test.The
Labor Board was not successful in avoiding disputes, and mediation
since 1926 has maintaIned peace.The average wages per hour and per
year, while less than those of the war period, have been gradually increas-
ing since 1923, and the employee morale 'has shown an iniprovement.
Employees are co-operating effectively with management in increasing
the efficiency of operation.The traffic units per man-hour were 17 per
cent greater in 1926 than in 1920, and 10 per cent greater than in 1923,
but the major part of the gain is attributable to improved facilities and
equipment.
The most notable achievement in railroad administration since the
war has been the marked increase in the efficiency with which equipment
has been utilized and trains operated.The car-miles per car-day have
been increased from 25.1 in 1920 to 30.3 in 1927, and the ton-miles per
car-day from 498 to 518.The 11 per cent more ton-miles o.f 1926 (the
high record), compared with 1920, were produced with but 2 per cent
more freight cars, notwithstanding a smaller average carload (over which
the railways have little control) and a larger percentage of empty car-
miles resulting from centralized distribution in shifting surplus cars from
one region to another as needed for prospective loading.Unserviceable
freight cars and locomotives have been reduced materially in number.
In train service, there has been a steady and consistent gain in the train
load from year to year since 1920, with a similar consistent gain in train
speed through a reduction in road delays.In 1920, the gross load per
train (cars and contents) was 1,443 tons; in 1927 it was 1,780 tons, a
gain of 24 per cent.In 1920, the average train speed between terminals
was 10.3 miles per hour; in 1927, it was 12.3 miles per hour, an increase
of 19 percent.In the inclusive unit combining load and speed—TRANSPORTATION 307
gross ton-miles per train-hour—the gain was from 14,876 to 21,945, an
increase in efficiency Of 48 per cent.This impressive gain in production
per train-hour was not purchased at the expense of higher ton-mile cost,
as the operating ratio for the service as a whole has been brought down
from 82.7 per cent in 1920 to 74.6 per cent in 1927, notwithstanding rate
reductions and losses in passenger traffic.. The greater efficiency in fuel
consumption stands out as a single item.The savings in coal in 1927,
in comparison with 1920, were 19 per cent in freight service and 13 per
cent in passenger service (on the basis of consumption per ton-mile
and per car-mile, respectively), and were equivalent in train service alone
to economies of $62,000,000 per year.Through better administration
of material and supplies held for use in maintenance, operation, and
construction, the savings in carrying charges in 1926, in comparison with
1920, were about
From the railway point of view, the only important unfavorable
element in the present situation is the low net return on value.The
1920 law was intended by Congress to give the railways a reasonable
assurance of a fair return, but the rate-making policy of the Interstate
Commerce Commission has not been consistent with that intention,The
Commission, effective in 1922, defined a fair return as per cent on
value, but in no year since the law was enacted in 1920 have the railways
earned that return.The work of valuation of railroad property is not
complete, and in its present stage is surrounded by many uncertainties
which are yet to be cleared up by the Supreme Court, but it seems not at
all unlikely that the final value, when determined, will be. little different
from the investment cost carried on the railway books.On that value,
plus working capital in cash and materials held for use, the net return
in operating income was 2.9 per cent in 1921, with a gradually increasing
rate up to 4.8 per cent in 1925 and 5.2 per cent in 1926, the year of great-
est freight traffic volume and greatest gross revenues.In: 1927, with
slightly less traffic, the return was but .4.5 per cent, and, for the first
10 months of 1928, it was at the rate of 4.7 per cent.The average for the
seven years ended with 1927 was 4.3 per cent, a rate inadequate as a
reward for taking the risks of investment, and plainly below the reward
that Congress intended as an incentive to adequate transportation
service to the public when the Transportation Act was passed.The
additional investments of the past eight years have been made with
faith in the assurance of a fair return.Although the fair return has
not been earned upon the total investment, it is likely that it would have
been even less without the additional investments, as they not oniy made
it possible to produce the greater volume of transportation since 1923
but also to produce it at lower cost.There is a limit, however, to the
extent to which new dollars can be devoted to saving old dollars already
Lower prices in 1926 contributed substantially to this result.308 RECENT ECONOMIC CHANGES
invested, and the present policy of betterments cannot long be continued
on an average return of 4.3 per cent on the whole.
Little progress has been made in carrying out the provisions of the
Transportation Act pertaining to the consolidation of all railways into
a limited number of systems of fairly equal financial strength.The
purpose of that part of the Act was to simplify the problems of rate-
making, and to insure reasonably uniform returns under uniform rates
to all of the railways in any region.The Interstate Commerce Com-
mission was directed to prepare a final plan to which all proposals
should conform, but the Commission has reached the conclusion that
the task is too difficult, and no final plan has been published.In the
meantime, no consolidations can take place because, according to law,
none can be approved unless it is in harmony with the Commission's final
plan not yet prepared.All that can be done is to approve unifications
by lease or stock control, but short of actual consolidation.A few such
proposals have been approved and others are before the Commission,
but the law instead of bringing about the intended large-scale consoli-
dations has, because of the inability of the Commission to prepare a final
plan, acted as a brake upon the long-time natural process under which
the existing systems have grown.An amendment to the law, proposing
a period in which consolidations, when believed by the Commission to
be in the public interest, may be effected voluntarily without regard to
a comprehensive plan, was favorably considered by Congress early in
1928, but was crowded off the calender in the closing days of the session.
From the public point of view, the outstanding railway development
since the war has been the marked improvement in transportation service.
The adequacy, speed, and dependability in freight movement have never
been better.The improvement is seen in freedom from car shortages,
embargoes, and other restrictions, and in close adherence to scheduled
transit times.The number of scheduled fast freight trains has been
increased and the speed bettered so as to give earlier deliveries at desti-
nation.Incidental services have been extended, and throughout the
whole service there is greater effort to apply modern merchandising
principles in the development and sale of transportation.The regularity
of movement and dependability in rail service have given impetus to the
general practice among manufacturers and merchants of carrying smaller
inventories of raw materials and merchandise.Better rail service can-
not be credited wholly with this economic development, but it called
attention to the possibilities and led to the general movement.Certain
it is that the smaller stocks would not afford adequate protection, were
rail service less prompt and reliable.The general reductions in inven-
tories have released sums of capital which in the aggregate are enormous,
and in buying habits have brought about profound changes which are
far-reaching in their economic effects.